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The objective of this study was to measure the associati n between regional 
competition and emergency care outcomes.  Competition was measured using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for three hospital referral egions in Maryland.  Preliminary 
regression analysis using a logistic binary model showed that higher competition was 
associated with lower odds of mortality. Further investigation suggested that competition 
could be endogenous.  Further regression analysis using an instrumental variable of 
hospital system affiliation and two-stage least squares estimation showed that lower 
competition was associated with lower odds of mortality for sepsis and trauma (OR = 0.7, 
p-value <0.001, OR = 0.5, p-value <0.001, respectivly).  Future investigation perhaps on 
a national level could help identify a stronger, more uniform association between 
competition and emergency care outcomes including large scale events, and as such 
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1: Introduction and Background 
With the increased focus on aligning quality and cost in healthcare, many 
hospitals have consolidated into hospital systems over the past two decades (Cuellar & 
Gertlar, 2003). This wave of mergers and acquisitions adds a competitive dimension to 
the quality of care paradigm, generating debate about the relationship between 
competition and delivery of healthcare. Basic economic theory posits that increased 
competition among providers generates higher quality (Baker, 2001); but this may not be 
true in unplanned critical illness due to (1) the immediate demand given the sudden 
occurrence of illness, (2) the lack of transparency i  health care price and quality and 
overall inability of patient to consider emergency medical care as a consumer good, and 
(3) reliance on cooperation between multiple components of the healthcare sector as well 
as between multiple hospitals to provide optimal medical care. For sudden, critical illness 
and injury, appropriate and timely emergency care is the difference between life and 
death - underscoring the need to explicitly examine the role of competition in emergency 
care-specific outcomes.    
It is possible for competition to drive quality in healthcare markets for scheduled 
and elective services (Kessler & McClellan, 2000; Sari, 2002; Porter & Teisberg, 2006; 
Cooper, Gibbons, Jones, McGuire, 2010). For planned care, consumers have the 
opportunity to research and choose the best facility based on a variety of perceived and 
technical hospital quality indicators (Miller, 1996). In the traditional economic theory of 
market competition, consumers are assumed to have full information to the quality of 
services that they purchase (Robinson, 1988), but this not always be in the case in 





emergency care are unlikely to be known by the individual before its occurrence (Lien, 
Chou & Liu, 2009). As a result, emergency care is inherently different. In cases of 
sudden, serious illness or injury, the provision of emergency care is intrinsically 
geography- and time-bound (Carr, Caplan, Pryor & Branas, 2006). The innate differences 
between planned and unscheduled care require a framework that addresses the unique 
challenges of the emergency care system.  
In the landmark emergency care report, the Institute of Medicine’s (2006) call for 
greater coordination between emergency care services suggests that cooperation in the 
emergency care system results in positive outcomes. It is much easier to build an 
organized and effective system of care when the scope is within a single, integrated 
hospital system, rather than a number of competing hospitals vying for greater market 
shares and profit margins. The U.S. economy typically re ies on market competition. 
However, in health care, competition pits clinician against clinician, and hospital against 
hospital (Nugent, 2003). These conflicting financial interests render it difficult, if not 
impossible, to fulfill the IOM’s (2006) vision of a high quality, coordinated emergency 
care system (Enthoven & Tollen, 2005).  
The need for improvement in quality and safety of health care has been reiterated 
by federal, state, industry, and non-government agencies (Institute of Medicine, 2001; 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2005). Increasingly stressed healthcare 
budgets (Kaiser Health News, 2012) coupled with natio l pressures for quality 
improvement force states and hospitals to reevaluate policies and allocation of resources. 
Despite the considerable number of performance improvement activities (Hibbard, 





interventions (Kaji et al., 2010; Cairns & Glickman, 2010), there are often consequential 
delays in treatment for emergency care sensitive conditi ns, including sepsis, trauma, 
acute ischemic stroke, cardiac arrest, and ST-segment el vation myocardial infarction. 
This lack of coordination is reflective of not only the emergency care system, but a 
larger, systemic failure in the current health care delivery system in the United States.  
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) reiterates the need for care coordination (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2014; Balto & Kovacs, 2013), spurring a frenzy of hospital mergers 
(Dafny, 2014). While the appropriate level of competition in healthcare is largely 
inconclusive (Gaynor & Town, 2012; Dafny, 2014), one may consider the notion that 
healthcare competition may not be intrinsically good r bad (Dash & Meredith, 2010). 
An examination of the impact of competition on quality and patient outcomes, 
specifically in emergency care, is warranted. To bridge this gap, this study examined the 
association between regional levels of competition and mortality for emergency care 
sensitive conditions using inpatient data from the state of Maryland.  
Adopting a macro-oriented approach, the State of Maryland’s innovative hospital 
payment system incorporates uniform rate-setting to control costs and improve the 
overall quality of care in Maryland hospitals (Health Services Cost Review Commission, 
2011). As the nation watches the Maryland model unfold, other states may be interested 
in experimenting with rate-setting systems. Under th  regulated payment system, the state 
of Maryland allows for a unique analytical study of the relationship between hospital 




2: Review of Healthcare Competition and Emergency Care Literature 
Competition holds the promise of bringing the socially optimal combination of 
price and quality (Baker, 2001). Previous studies have found positive effects of 
competition on quality, social welfare, mortality and price (Gaynor & Town, 2012; 
Kessler & McClellan, 2000; Miller, 1996; Bloom, Propper, Seiler, Van Rennan, 2010). 
Consolidated systems can raise prices through its dominant market influence (Capps, 
2010; Melnick, Shen & Wu, 2011; Balto & Kovacs, 2013; Rosenthal, 2014), increasing 
costs for consumers.  
The American Hospital Association (AHA) (2014) defines a system as a 
“multihospital system with two or more hospitals owned, leased, sponsored or contract 
managed by a central organization … but does not preclude network participation.” As 
hospital mergers and acquisitions take place, systems of care are formed among the 
various hospitals. A study of hospital consolidation in the nation’s 306 hospital referral 
regions (HRR) found that hospital prices in concentrated local healthcare markets were 
significantly higher (Robinson, 2011). While large h alth systems are capable of creating 
economies of scale, these cost savings may not be passed onto consumers (Gaynor & 
Town, 2012). In essence, hospital competition allows providers to compete on not only 
price but also quality indicators (Miller, 1996), potentially driving improvements in 
delivery of care.  
In contrast to the U.S.’s traditionally free-market, competitive approach towards 
the economy, many of the ACA reforms drive market consolidation in the healthcare 
market (Gottlieb, 2012; George, 2013; Pope, 2014). Hospitals face ACA-related 





Budget Office, 2010), improving operational efficiency through smooth care transitions 
(Balto & Kovacs, 2013; HHS, 2014), and managing population health (Dafny, 2014). 
These goals are designed to improve care of coordination among providers and generate 
high quality care (Anderson, 2014).  
From a systemic perspective, the U.S. healthcare syst m’s lack of coordination 
presents a significant and fundamental challenge in delivery of quality care and ensuring 
patient safety (Institute of Medicine, 2001). While hospital consolidation emerges as the 
healthcare industry’s premier solution to these reforms and emerging threats, other 
methods of achieving the ACA’s goals of operational efficiency and smooth care 
transitions include use of health information exchanges, communal learning networks and 
accountability (HHS, 2014), ultimately revolving around the idea of collaboration among 
multiple hospitals.  
The logic behind hospital consolidation complements the ACA’s goals of 
improving care coordination (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013); integrated hospitals can 
provide seamless transitions in care. Consolidated systems are able to create economies 
of scale (Balto & Kovacs, 2013) and produce better outcomes (Cutler & Morton, 2013; 
Romano & Balan, 2010; Tsi & Jha, 2014). Findings from disease management literature 
support this; patients with moderate to severe illnss experience benefits from 
coordinated care (Wennberg & Wennberg, 2003). Within integrated systems, hospitals 
are financially incentivized to work together to offer a continuum of care (Wan, Lin & 
Ma, 2001) by pooling resources and increasing clout.  
Despite the overall fragmentation of the health care delivery system, notable 





outcomes, cut costs, or both through its organization l processes (Shih, Davis, 
Shoenbaum, Gauthier, Nuzman & McCarthy, 2008).  These high-performing health 
systems reveal the ability of integrated health system  to achieve coordination of care 
(Shih et al., 2008). The Geisinger Health System, a commonly highlighted example of 
positive hospital consolidation outcomes (Tsi & Jha, 2014), implemented a coordinated 
bundle of evidence-based best practices, resulting in a “100 percent lower in-hospital 
mortality [and] 21 percent decrease in patients with any complications” (McCarthy, 
Mueller & Wrenn, 2009). Furthermore, average length of stay, hospital readmissions, and 
overall treatment costs have all decreased substantially (Menninger, 2009). Similarly, the 
Mayo Clinic developed its model of integrated care, s documented in its Mayo Clinic 
Model of Care, to achieve quality improvement initiatives. The system’s redesigned care 
processes to improve the timeliness of heart attack reatment, by reducing door-to-balloon 
time from 92 minutes to 60 minutes (McCarthy, Mueller & Wrenn, 2009). The 
correlation between integrated hospital systems and positive performances can prompt 
further consolidation to take place, but also spur collaboration among different hospital 
systems to achieve the same system-based outcomes fr the entire population.  
2.1 Hospital Consolidation Trends 
Adopting this rationale, healthcare markets across the nation are undergoing a 
considerable number of mergers, transforming previously independent hospitals into a 
health system centered on inpatient institutions (Cutler & Morton, 2013). In the pre-ACA 
period of 1999 to 2003, the typical metropolitan stati ical area experienced a reduction 
from six to four competing local hospital systems (Vogt & Town, 2006), reducing the 





decade; from 2007 to 2012, 432 mergers and acquisition  were announced, involving 832 
hospitals (Cutler & Morton, 2013).  
This anticompetitive trend is reflected at the state level as well. In 2012, only 15 
of Maryland’s 46 general hospitals were independent (Gantz, 2012). These remaining 
independent hospitals in Maryland are at risk for financial insolubility as they cope with 
the pervasive problems of reduced reimbursement rates, weak negotiating clout, and lack 
of resources to meet the ACA’s mandates of increased reporting and adoption of 
electronic health records (Weintraub, 2010). A prominent organizational strategy to 
enhance capabilities or procurement is to form partnerships with other organizations 
(Provan, 1984), leading to horizontal integration. Horizontal integration takes place when 
organizations, hospitals in this case, at the same level merge together (Investopedia, 
2014). For example, Sibley Memorial Hospital joined the Johns Hopkins Health System, 
located in Baltimore, MD, to generate “more efficient, integrated regional health care 
services for patients” (Sibley Memorial Hospital, 2010). Similarly, Regional Health 
System, Meritus Health and Western Maryland Health System are in strategic discussions 
to create a regional alliance between the three indpendent hospitals (Meritus Health, 
2014). As the number of independent, unattached hospital  diminish, patients will 
ascertain the proposed consolidation benefits along with its unintended consequences.  
Antitrust laws exist to protect consumers from higher prices resulting from 
monopolistic activity (Balto & Kovacs, 2013), such as mergers and acquisitions. Under 
the premise of a competitive environment, a greater number of firms will promote 
economic welfare and efficiency, because it becomes ore difficult for firms to 





setting. However, this also makes it more difficult for the firms to facilitate care 
coordination or resource sharing, creating quality concerns (Bodenheimer, 2008).  
As policymakers and hospital industry debate over extent to which government 
regulation is needed to regulate healthcare market consolidation (Bazzoli et al., 1995; Ho 
& Hamilton, 2000), it is important to consider the endogeneity of healthcare competition. 
Both competition and consolidation approaches offer quality improvements, suggesting 
that a contextual framework may be appropriate in examining this intricate relationship in 
emergency care.  
Demand for healthcare is considered largely inelastic (Newhouse & Phelps, 1974; 
Ringel, Hosek, Vollard & Mahnovski, 2002), but price elasticity may be even more rigid 
in emergency care. The unplanned nature and severity of emergency care is exposed to 
substantial time and geography constraints. For instance, the closest facility could be 
considered the “best” facility, opposed to hospital quality and condition-specific 
considerations. Hospital Compare, a CMS innovation for information about quality of 
care, states that the website’s resources may be used as guidance for planned health care 
needs, but recommends the nearest hospital in an emerg ncy. This juxtaposition signifies 
the need to differentiate between planned and unplan ed care, when assessing quality and 
outcomes.  
2.2 Delivery of Emergency Care 
The ACA reforms are centered on aims of care coordination, quality, and cost-
cutting but frame around chronic disease management and scheduled care considerations, 
rather than emergency care. The ACA’s goals are large y influenced by minimizing 
economic costs opposed to years of productive life lost, implications of a poorly-





efficiency among accountable care organizations (ACOs) and patient-centered medical 
homes promote the creation of “teams,” creating the notorious silos in healthcare. 
Because there is no competitive advantage in sharing information between different 
teams that do not share common goals, information is not shared and there is little 
interoperability among these providers.  
The consequences of this fragmentation and lack of ommunication in emergency 
care systems is intensified in this context. Acute unscheduled care poses significant and 
stringent time-bounds in order to improve patient outc mes and requires intensive 
resources. For instance, a car crash instigates a by t nder to call 9-1-1 for help. The 
injured individual is taken to the nearest hospital, with little to no regard for the patient’s 
preference for treatment location, especially if the patient is unable to communicate. The 
nearest hospital may not offer the subspecialty care required for the individual’s 
condition – requiring a compromise between the hospital’s desire for greater economic 
gain and the patient’s best interest. The hospital needs to be willing to give away the 
patient, a source of revenue, to another facility that can better meet his or her needs to 
ensure good patient outcomes. In this sense, the emerg ncy care system requires 
substantial continuum of care – the ED and emergency medical services (EMS) should 
pass on information to promote greater coordination of care and ultimately, ensure 
improved population health.    
The ED plays a unique and substantial role in this framework of population health 
outcomes. The ED represents the most available and immediate source of care for 
critical, acute illness, while simultaneously serving as a gateway for inpatient admissions, 





2011). Emergency care utilization is a function of the severity of patient’s complaint, 
time, and proximity (Ragin et al., 2005; Richardson & Hwang, 2001).  
The ED functions in a comprehensive capacity; it is a critical staging area for 
unplanned and acute illness (Schurr, Hsia, Burstin, Schull & Pines, 2013) and a safety net 
provider. For uninsured patients, the ED can function as a source of usual care 
(Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act, 2003). As a result, high ED utilization 
trends reflect its integral role on the healthcare sp ctrum. Since 1997, the annual number 
of ED visits has increased by 23% (Niska, Bhuiya & Xu, 2010), comprising of nearly all 
growth for inpatient hospital admissions (Morganti et al., 2013). Depending on the type 
of facility, between 30 to 75 percent of inpatient stays originate from the ED (Pines, 
2006), with a national average of 12.5 percent of inpatient admissions. Inpatient 
admissions serve as the bulk of the hospital’s revenue, amassing to 31 percent of national 
healthcare spending (Morganti et al., 2013).  
While previous studies yield inconclusive results about the financial impact of 
EDs, whether it accrues profits for the hospital from high costs of care and or incurs 
losses from its higher severity patient mix (Wilson & Cutler, 2014), the ED acts as an 
important decision maker for inpatient admissions (Morganti et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
implementation of the ACA is predicted to increase profits for hospital-based EDs 
(Wilson & Cutler, 2014). With this financial leverage at stake, hospitals compete for 
greater market shares, subsequently spurring a high level of internal rivalry in emergency 
care.  
It is important to distinguish between the levels of reimbursement for different 





expensive conditions. However, these lucrative conditions do not comprise of unplanned 
critical illness. Without the opportunity for greatr economic gains, emergency care 
systems have little incentive to change and implement more patient-centered and 
population-health focus. The hospital costs for treating septicemia, an emergency care 
sensitive condition and one of the leading causes of mortality (Centers for Disease 
Control & Prevention, 2009), is regulated at an aver g  of $19,075 (HSCRC, 2013) in 
Maryland. On the other hand, a cesarean delivery has associated charges of $23,173 
(HSCRC, 2013). The difference in pricing between these two common inpatient 
conditions reflects the greater profitability in planned and elective care, including 
procedures such as transplants, chemotherapy, and cardia  surgery, and the need to 
redesign incentives for emergency care systems to deliver high-quality care.  
Coupling the IOM (2006) report on the future of emergency care with the ACA’s 
National Quality Strategy, the emergency care system and the overall health system face 
analogous challenges and opportunities, underscoring the need for greater coordination of 
care between the two entities. Reports of substandard and inconsistent emergency care 
(Plantz, Kreplick, Panacek, Mehta, Adler & McNamara, 1997) serve as impetus for 
quality improvements. The National Quality Strategy aims to improve access, safety, care 
coordination, and use of evidence-based interventions t  deliver high quality care (HHS, 
2011); these objectives are all transferrable to the delivery of emergency care.  
Emergency care is inherently team-based, involving multiple providers and 
interactions between pre-hospital emergency medical services, nurses, and emergency 
physicians (Schurr et al., 2013; Pines, 2006). High-quality emergency care and smooth 





therapeutic interventions for emergency conditions may require substantial resources. A 
ST-segment elevation myocardial infarction (STEMI) requires percutaneous coronary 
intervention (PCI), involving both the ED and cardiology units (Rathore et al., 2009), 
serving as impetus for developing multidisciplinary teams.  
Through a cooperative stance, providers may ascertain qu lity improvements 
through care coordination, information and resource sharing. On a macro scale, 
cooperation among medical personnel, suppliers, and facilities in disasters and large scale 
emergencies is necessary for patient triage and medical surge (Waeckerle, 1991; Jacobs, 
Ramp & Breay, 1979). After all, the best way to prepare for a large scale disaster is to 
create an emergency care system that functions effectively on an everyday basis 
(Kellerman, 2006).  
2.3 Emergency Care Sensitive Conditions 
Toward the overarching goal of preparedness, the medical community can 
examine and enhance the emergency system’s functions and outcomes on a day to day 
basis. Despite these beneficent intentions, quality measurement for emergency care 
requires more refinement. CMS’s Physician Quality Reporting Initiative Program and 
Hospital Compare, as well as accrediting agencies including the Joint Commission, 
provide quality measures. However, many of the proposed measures do not reflect the 
systemic nature of emergency care problems and outcomes, in addition to integrating the 
goal of providing high-value, integrated emergency care (Schurr et al., 2013).  
Positive emergency care outcomes reflect the ability of he whole emergency 
system to provide coordinated, quality care, opposed to just examining the capabilities or 
processes of a single facility. The emergency care sensitive conditions (ECSC) 





significantly impact patient outcome (Carr et al., 2010). The development of this quality 
measurement paradigm is analogous to AHRQ’s ambulatory care sensitive conditions, for 
which high quality preventative care may reduce hospitalizations (National Quality 
Measures Clearinghouse, 2014). ECSCs include ischemi  stroke, cardiac arrest, sepsis, 
trauma, and STEMI – the outcomes of these time-sensitive conditions can reflect high-
quality emergency care.   
For these emergency conditions, the patient would be taken to the most 
appropriate facility based on the severity of the condition or facilities’ distances (Institute 
of Medicine, 2006) in efforts to promote better quality care and outcomes. It emphasizes 
the concepts of cooperation and commitment to safety, in order to get the patients the 
right care at the right place at the right time (Kellermann & Martinez, 2011).  
Appropriate treatment for emergency care sensitive conditions may require a 
substantial number of resources, in addition to rapid diagnosis, creating a need for 
different emergency care services to collaborate in order to promote patient outcomes. 
The trauma system’s success in significantly reducing mortality for traumatic injuries 
(MacKenzie et al., 2006) highlights the benefits of regionalization towards providing 
patients with the resources they require in a timely manner (Myers, Branas, Kallan, 
Wiebe, Nance & Carr, 2011). Because not all hospitals contain trauma centers or 
resources to adequately care for trauma patients, there has been significant system 
planning to ensure efficient and effective delivery of care (Branas, MacKenzie & 
ReVelle, 2000). Through this approach towards population outcomes, the trauma system 





improving population health, for other unplanned critical illness, such as acute ischemic 
stroke, STEMI, and cardiac arrest.  
 
Stroke and STEMI can be detected by ambulance staff to n extent (Harbison, 
Hossain, Jenkinson, Davis, Louw & Ford, 2003; Eckstein, Cooper, Nguyen & Pratt, 
2009) indicating a minor difference between these two condition from cardiac arrest and 
sepsis, which require more equipment and tests to diagnose. Furthermore, the diagnostic 
opportunity during paramedic transport reinforces the need for greater system 
communication and collaboration to ensure that stroke and STEMI patients are delivered 
to the most capable facility. Stroke patients that receive early stroke treatment, tissue 
plasminogen activator (rt-PA) have better outcomes, if treatment is administered within 
90 minutes (Marler et al., 2000). Ambulance staff, s well as patients’ families, can 
perform a face arm speech test for suspected stroke pati nts (Harbison et al., 2003) and 
with adequate knowledge of stroke symptoms. This can eliminate the need for transfers 
from within facilities or to another hospital, in order for the stroke patient to receive the 
necessary treatment. Similarly, STEMI can be diagnosed by an ambulance ECG 
(Eckstein et al., 2009) to ensure that the patient r ceives the necessary reperfusion 
therapy. For stroke and STEMI patients, hospitals that have the resources to effectively 
treat these conditions are obviously better suited and can promote improved patient 
outcomes. These evidence-based strategies demonstrate reduced odds of mortality and 
can be considered in emergency care system models to improve collaboration between 9-





Cardiac arrest has considerably high rates of mortality (McNally et al., 2009). Its 
high fatality rate poses a significant public health burden. In out-of-hospital cardiac 
arrests, induced hypothermia has demonstrated improved utcomes and survival (Bernard 
et al., 2002). However, only nine hospitals in the state of Maryland offer therapeutic 
hypothermia resources, implying the need for collabr tion and resource sharing among 
providers in the state.  
While the etymology of the term ‘emergency care’ fixates on the emergency 
department, quality care and patient outcomes are abyproduct of the whole emergency 
care system. The U.S. healthcare system is highly fragmented and variable (IOM, 2006), 
resulting in inefficient and poor quality care. Upon consideration of emergency 
preparedness and the ECSC framework, themes of cooperation and collaboration emerge. 
As quality measures are beginning to shift towards ssessing and incentivizing care 
coordination, meaningful measures must also include the most basic outcomes measure 
on the lowest end of the quality spectrum, mortality.   
2.4 Sepsis – A Public Health Concern 
There are a number of ED interventions that have demonstrated reduced mortality 
and improved outcomes for patients with acute, time-sensitive conditions (Kaji et al., 
2010) but have not been implemented nationally. Sepsis, a costly condition, remains a 
major public health concern (Angus, 2010; Rhee, Gohil & Klompas, 2014). The 
condition manifests itself as a potentially life-threatening complication of a severe 
infection (Al-Khafaji, Sharma & Eschun, 2014), characterized by pathogenic 
microorganisms (Weidemann, 2007). Without adequate medical attention, the immune 
system remains in a state of dysregulated inflammation (Rhee et al., 2014) and triggers 





Glass, 2010). This may lead the development of one or multiple organ dysfunctions 
(American College of Chest Physicians/Society of Critical Care Medicine Consensus 
Conference, 1992), acting in a cascade ranging fromsystemic inflammatory response 
syndrome to septic shock (Bone, 1991).  
There are a number of proven emergency department interventions designed to 
reduce mortality and improve outcomes for patients wi h acute, time-sensitive illnesses 
(Cairns & Glickman, 2010; Kai et al., 2010). Despite twenty years of extensive research, 
therapeutic approaches to sepsis have not been successfully translated to the clinical 
setting (Rittirsch, Fierl, Ward, 2008). Rivers et al. (2001) introduced Early Goal Directed 
Therapy in 2001 as a protocol-based resuscitation, involving the use of a central venous 
catheter, blood transfusions, medications, and involvement of critical-care clinicians. In 
this landmark study, Rivers et al. (2001) suggest that the use of Early Goal-Directed 
Therapy (EGDT) provide significant benefits for sepis patient mortality outcomes, later 
serving as one the “cornerstone of the Surviving Sepsis Campaign guidelines” (Levinson, 
Casserly & Levy, 2011).  
While there remains controversy over sepsis coding methodology (Gaieski et al., 
2013; Angus et al., 2001; Wang, Shapiro, Angus & Yealy, 2007; Dombrovskiy et al., 
2007; Martin, Mannino, Eaton & Moss, 2003) and care mandates (Rhee et al., 2014; 
Peake et al., 2014; Yealy et al.; 2014), “increased [awareness] and recognition of novel 
therapeutic strategies have led to renewed focus by hospitals to improve outcomes in 





2.4.1 Sepsis Incidence and Mortality  
Despite national attention on quality improvement and the condition itself, sepsis 
incidence and mortality rates continue to increase (Gaiski et al., 2013; Martin, Mannino, 
Eaton & Moss, 2003; Hall, Williams, DeFrances & Golonskiy, 2011). Kaiser Permanente 
(2012) attributes sepsis to causing more deaths in California hospitals than stroke, heart 
disease or cancer. Despite the decrease in the case fat lity rate, researchers found that the 
national rates of death from severe sepsis increased (Gaieski et al., 2013). The number of 
hospitalizations for septicemia or sepsis as a first-linked or principal diagnosis increased 
to 727,000 cases in 2008 (Hall et al., 2011). Sepsis hospitalization rates more than 
doubled from 2000 through 2008 (Hall et al., 2011) in conjunction with national rates of 
sepsis mortality increasing (Gaeiski et al., 2013).  
As with any condition, it is important to consider other factors that may contribute 
to the increased incidence. Previous studies have indicated that increased rates of sepsis 
incidence can be attributed to an aging population with an increasing burden of disease 
(Hall et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2003; McBean & Rasamani, 2001), increased awareness  
(Gaieski et al., 2013), greater use of invasive procedures, immunosuppressive drugs, use 
of chemotherapy and transplantation, microbial resistance to antibiotics (Hall et al., 2011) 
and improvement in coding practices for reimbursement schemes (Gaieski et al., 2013; 
Rhee et al., 2014). In essence, patients with sepsi face significant healthcare challenges 
ranging on the spectrum of functional disability to death.  
While anyone is susceptible to sepsis, the elderly and those with compromised 
immune systems are at greater risk for developing complications (Ayres, 1985; Hall et 
al., 2011) and significantly contribute to causes of death for patients admitted to intensive 





hospitalization rates than those under 65 (Hall et al., 2011). Furthermore, those aged 65 
and older hospitalized for sepsis faced a 20 percent mortality rate compared to three 
percent for other hospitalizations (Hall et al., 2011). As the aging population continues to 
grow, with estimates of the elderly expected to comprise of 20 percent of the total 
population in 2050 (Ortman, Velkhoff & Hogan, 2014), indicates that sepsis may be of 
even greater concern in the future.  
Sepsis is difficult to predict, diagnose and treat (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2014), resulting in a high mortality rate nd potentially diminished quality of 
life (Yende & Angus, 2007). While death is the most apparent and obvious end point of 
sepsis, it is important to acknowledge the other consequences of the disease’s symptoms 
of organ dysfunction including neurological impairment, respiratory impairment and 
renal failure (Yende & Angus, 2007).  
2.4.2 War on Sepsis 
Sepsis awareness efforts like the Surviving Sepsis Campaign and STOP Sepsis 
Collaborative are coordinated alliances that encourage collaboration to reduce sepsis 
mortality (Vassalos & Rooney, 2013; United Hospital Fund, 2014). Despite the 
controversy of best practices for sepsis coding and therapeutic intervention, analysis of 
sepsis outcomes can provide insight on the potential benefits of hospital system 
cooperation on a local healthcare market for emergency care conditions.  
Variations in healthcare and inconsistent care practices generate serious concerns 
about quality of care (Wennberg & Wennberg, 2003). Wennberg (2002) concedes that 
wide variations in everyday practice are unwarranted in the field of clinical science. 





among HRRs, indicating geographic disparities. The implications of variations in clinical 
interventions can be observed in a variety of fields. Morris (2004) detected errors in 
clinical setting were linked to the lack of clinical standardization for iatrogenic illness. 
Similarly, proven interventions for altering the sep is care pathway exist (Rivers et al., 
2001; Yealy et al., 2014; Peake et al., 2014) but there is no national standard for sepsis 
treatment.  
There remains relative ambiguity in denominating a standard sepsis treatment for 
widespread use. Early aggressive volume resuscitation under the premise of EGDT 
remains the basis of standard sepsis treatment (Rice & Bernard, 2007) as part of the 
bundle treatment. A bundle is a group of interventions that product synergistic outcomes 
when implemented together, rather than individually (Zambon, Ceola, Almeida-de-
Castro, Gullo & Vincent, 2008). Recent publications of the ProCESS (Yealy et al., 2014) 
and ARISE (Peake et al., 2014) trials, reexamining the traditional sepsis bundle 
treatments, suggest the use of EGDT in sepsis care best practices may be questionable. 
This is reminiscent of the since-retired pneumonia qu lity measure, yielding unintended 
consequences of antibiotic resistance (Schurr et al., 2013). This historical precedence and 
current ambiguity towards appropriate clinical interventions renders uncertainty towards 
current sepsis mandates and best practices.  
Despite the relative feasibility of implementing a sepsis bundle in the emergency 
department and intensive care unit setting (Nguyen, Corbett, Steele, Banta, Clark, Hayes 
& Edwards, 2007; Zambon et al., 2008), compliance rat s remain relatively low (Miguel-
Yanes, Andueza-Lillo, Gonzalez-Ramallo, Pastor & Munoz, 2006; Zambon et al., 2008; 





(Ferrer et al., 2008) and inconclusiveness about sepsi  best practices (Yealy et al., 2014; 
Peake et al., 2014) and coding (Gaieski et al., 2013). This lack of general compliance 
even years after the Surviving Sepsis Campaign guidelines’ implementation reveal the 
need to simplify the bundle to increase its clinical accessibility (Zambon et al., 2008). 
Hospitals and physicians face a tremendous challenge in diagnosing and treating a 
disease rapidly and accurately, with minimal guidance.  
Previous studies indicate the rate of compliance with the 6-hour and 24-hour 
sepsis bundles to be 52% and 30%, respectively (Gao, Mel dy, Daniels, Giles & Fox, 
2005). Furthermore, 39% of acute adult emergency patients were admitted to the 
intensive care unit late into the clinical care pathway (McQuillan et al., 1998) These 
findings reiterate the need for improving the structure and process of delivery of care 
(McQuillian et al., 1998). Despite the controversy over the EGDT mandate and the 
results of the ProCESS and ARISE trials, sepsis bundles demonstrate clinical 
effectiveness in reducing hospital mortality of sepsis patients (Gao et al., 2005).  
In response to the Institute of Medicine’s (2001) call for delivering high quality 
medical care, hospital systems honed in on quality improvement initiatives under the 
premise of improving outcomes while reducing costs (Shortell, Bennett & Byck, 2001). 
Several hospital systems engaged in efforts to reduce sepsis mortality through improving 
early detection and appropriate treatment strategies. Rincon, Bourke & Ikeda (2007) 
suggest that centralized remote identification of at-risk sepsis patients can improve 
compliance to sepsis management and best practices. Th  implementation of a 
multicenter sepsis bundle at Intermountain Health System resulted in a 59% relative 





System includes 18 intensive care units (ICU) and 11 hospitals in Utah and Idaho (Miller 
et al., 2013). Similarly, Kaiser Permanente’s systematic approach to sepsis identification 
and management reduced mortality from 24.6% in March 2008 to 11.5% in December 
2010 (Crawford, Skeath & Whippy, 2012). This multicenter approach could serve as an 
organizational framework for other emergency care systems and conditions. In 
conjunction with these health systems’ sepsis initiatives, Penn Medicine’s 
implementation of an algorithm for an early warning system to identify sepsis patients 
has led to a 4% decrease in sepsis mortality (McCann, 2014). These coordinated efforts 
and progress towards sepsis reduction reflects the abilities of collaborative and integrated 
health systems to streamline delivery of care, producing better outcomes (Cutler & 
Morton, 2013; Bodenheimer, 2008).   
2.5 The State of Maryland’s Initiative 
Quality improvement in sepsis and other emergency care onditions can take 
place through coordinated clinical efforts as well as policy levers. Hospital costs totaled 
$387 billion in 2011 (Torio & Andrews, 2013), indicating that costs and quality may be 
better addressed simultaneously in improvement initiatives. High levels of healthcare 
spending, accounting for nearly two-fifths of overall U.S. economic activity (KFF, 2012), 
invite reforms.  
Many cite the traditional fee-for-service payment system as the culprit for 
increased health spending, without corresponding improvements in health outcomes 
(Orszag & Ellis, 2007). In contrast to the fee-for-service approach of rewarding providers 
on case volume, Maryland’s innovative payment model realigns hospital payments to 
improve quality of healthcare (HSCRC, 2011). Akin with the ACA’s goals of reducing 





Medicaid Services (2014) and the state of Maryland established a partnership to develop 
the nation’s only uniform payment regulation system, in which all third parties pay the 
same rates.  
Established in 1971, Maryland’s rate-setting system allows the state to control and 
budget hospital costs (Shurkin, 2014) and more recently, set goals that emphasize quality, 
not quantity in care (Coyle, 2014). In the past fewdecades, Maryland has demonstrated 
success in reducing costs per admission (Anderson, Chaulk & Fowler, 1993) and growth 
(Murray, 2014), from 24 percent above the national average in 1977 to 11 percent below 
the national average within two decades (McDonough, 1995). Currently, the system has 
“saved the sate more than $45 billion in health care costs” (Coyle, 2014).  
Maryland’s All Payer-Model serves as impetus and potential framework for 
improving delivery of care (Rajkumar et al., 2014). Maryland hospitals have retained 
their “reputation for clinical excellence” (Coyle, 2014). The U.S. News & World Report 
(2014) ranks Johns Hopkins Hospital within the top three performers along with a 
number of Joint Commission accredited facilities. This partnership between Maryland 
and CMS can reveal the advantageous link between hospital payment systems and 
improved health outcomes (Murray, 2014) to serve as a potential model for the rest of the 
nation.  
2.5.1 Sepsis in Maryland 
Under the new Medicaid waiver effective January 2014, the state of Maryland is 
charged with the task of reducing infections and hospital-acquired infections by 30 
percent within five years (Centers for Medicare andMedicaid Services, 2014). The 





as a patient safety indicator (HSCRC, 2013; AHRQ, 2009), revealing the state’s quality 
improvement enterprise. Going forward, the Maryland Hospital Association and 
Maryland Patient Safety Center developed Improving Sepsis Survival, a federal-industry 
sepsis mortality reduction initiative for Maryland hospitals (Maryland Hospital 
Association, 2014) to meet this target. Sepsis, the most expensive condition treated in 
hospitals, amounting to over $20 billion in 2011 (Torio & Andrews, 2013), along with its 
high disease burden, renders it an extremely effectual target in meeting the Medicare 
Waiver’s financial and quality targets.    
The Maryland Patient Safety Center operates as a non-for-profit organization and 
is listed as a Patient Safety Organization by the Ag ncy for Healthcare Research and 
Quality under the provisions of Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 
(Maryland Patient Safety Organization, 2014). Functio ing as an American Hospital 
Association ally, the Maryland Hospital Association s an independent organization 
focused on serving as Maryland’s hospitals and healt  systems’ advocate (Maryland 
Hospital Association, 2014). The collaboration between these two independent 
organizations signifies the need, and inherent ability, for quality improvement paradigms 
to scale beyond just the health system.  
Beginning in July 2014, ten Maryland hospitals participated in the initiative’s first 
cohort (Maryland Patient Safety Center, 2014), including hospital systems and 
independent hospitals. In the Baltimore Hospital Referral Region, participating hospitals 
include: Carroll Hospital Center, Johns Hopkins Hospital, LifeBridge Health System’s 
Northwest Hospital, LifeBridge Health System’s Sinai Hospital of Baltimore and 





Hospital and MedStar Montgomery Medical Center in the Takoma Park Hospital Referral 
Region are participants as well. The unique mix of hospitals in bed size, affiliation with a 
health system, location, and reputation allows the sepsis collaborative implementation to 
not only be more generalizable, but also represents the tatewide, collaborative aspect of 
improving healthcare. As future cohorts unveil, it may become possible to assess the 
impact of the collaborative on not only sepsis mortality but also guide future quality 
improvement paradigms.  
2.6 Conceptual Framework 
Recent hospital consolidation trends bring attention o the role of competition and 
its influence on delivery of care and controlling costs. There is no consensus, however, as 
to the appropriate level of competition in health care to facilitate delivery of care. 
Previous studies have examined the association between competition and price, 
attempting to extract the influence of cost on the ov rarching healthcare problem. 
However, quality problems remain pervasive in the U.S. healthcare system. A number of 
studies found positive effects of competition on patient outcomes, but cannot be 
generalized beyond the planned care setting. Consequently, questions remain about the 
role of competition on emergency care outcomes.  
The role of emergency care and its associated challenges, especially in the context 
of delivery of quality care, remains undetermined. As an essential part of the healthcare 
system, the ED provides a variety of challenges and opportunities to move forward in the 
quality of care dialogue. However, a better understanding of the role of competition in 
emergency care is important, demanding the need for further research in this sector. This 





care outcomes, providing implications for coordination and competition in emergency 
care.  
2.7 Specific Aims 
In light of the limitations in previous literature and exigency for a better 
understanding of quality in emergency care, this study examined the association between 
hospital competition within a region and inpatient ou comes for emergency care sensitive 
conditions. If such a relationship exists, this study sought to measure this effect. This 
cross-sectional, observational data analysis assessed the association of competition on 
emergency care patient outcomes, focusing on inpatient hospital mortality for five 
emergency care sensitive conditions: sepsis, trauma, acute ischemic stroke, cardiac arrest 
and STEMI. In essence, the study sought to characterize the role of competition in 
emergency care for patient outcomes.  
3: Methodology 
3.1 Research Question 
1. Is there an association between health system competition and emergency care 
outcomes?   
3.2 Study Design 
 A retrospective regression analysis assessed the effect of hospital system 
competition for a given hospital referral region on inpatient mortality originating from the 
emergency department. The analysis focused on the following conditions: Sepsis, trauma, 
acute ischemic stroke, cardiac arrest, and ST-segment el vation myocardial infarction. 
This data analysis was conducted using the Agency for Healthcare Research and 





Maryland for dates of service 2012, American Hospital Association, and Dartmouth Atlas 
of Healthcare.  
The SID is collected annually by the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality, and contains the universe of inpatient admissions to community hospitals for all 
payer types. The SID data is supplemented by descriptive hospital information from the 
American Hospital Association (AHA) to enable more in-depth empirical analyses of the 
role of hospital system competition on emergency care inpatient mortality.  
This database contained detailed diagnostic, billing, and patient demographic 
information for 695,207 inpatient episodes in the 201  year, of which 70,677 cases were 
used for the emergency conditions being considered in this study. The Maryland SID is 
composed of more than 200 variables, including up to 30 International Classification of 
Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) diagnoses, discharge status 
from the ED, admission type (e.g. emergency, urgent, elective), patient demographics 
(e.g., gender, age, race, urban-rural designation of patient residence, national quartile of 
median household income for patient’s ZIP code), expected payment source (e.g. 
Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance), admission type and hospital identifiers allowing 
supplementary hospital-level information (e.g. bed size, teaching status, hospital 
ownership, and hospital system affiliation) to be linked.  
3.3 Analytic Approach 
 This study examined the association between hospital system competition, the 
main predictor variable, and inpatient hospital mortality for emergency care sensitive 
conditions, the study’s outcome variable. The conceptual framework is depicted in Figure 
1.1. Using AHA data on nonfederal, short-term general and specialty hospitals, the 





calculate a competition measure for the corresponding local healthcare markets. For the 
purpose of this study, the local healthcare market is delineated as the hospital referral 
region, as defined by the Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare (Wennberg & Cooper, 1996).  
The study used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure competition 
and subsequently analyze its association with inpatent hospital mortality for emergency 
care conditions (Cutler & Morton, 2013). Association between inpatient hospital 
mortality and the independent variable of hospital competition is examined with the use 
of a multivariable binary logistic regression model. HHIs were also calculated for 
inpatient admissions originating from the ED as well as specific conditions under study. 
These modifications of competition allowed for a comparative analysis of the role of 









Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework of the regression analysis. Including the 
instrumental variable of hospital system affiliation, main explanatory variable of regional 















3.4 Study Population 
The dataset for inpatient admissions, originating from the emergency department, 
that fit the emergency conditions of interest, contained a total of 70,677 observations. The 
parameters for study population selection is highlighted in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: Selection of study population and number of observations for each 
condition. Data was obtained from the Maryland SID 2012 data. Patients with limited 
demographic information were excluded.  
 
The study population included patients classified with ICD-9 codes for the 
following emergency care sensitive conditions: sepsis, trauma, acute ischemic stroke, 
cardiac arrest, and STEMI as characterized in Appendix C. The sepsis cohort contained 
26,291 observations, 28,216 observations for trauma, 11,228 observations for acute 
ischemic stroke, 2,125 observations for cardiac arrest, and 2,817 observations for STEMI.  
3.4.1 Coding Methodology 
While there remains a general consensus that the incide ce of sepsis is increasing 





2013), there is substantial variability in the actul incidence and mortality rates, 
depending on coding methodology (Gaieski et al., 2013). The lack of widely accepted 
definitions of sepsis and its complications has made it ifficult to obtain accurate 
estimates of its incidence and mortality (Bochud & Calandra, 2007). One study 
examining sepsis coding variability utilized different sepsis coding schemes and found 
that the annual average incidence of sepsis varied s much as 3.5-fold (Gaieski et al., 
2013). Despite the introduction of the new ICD-9 codes designated for sepsis, severe 
sepsis, and septic shock diagnoses; these codes are not used uniformly and still require 
the use of supplemental infection codes (Gaieski et al., 2013). The accuracy of ICD-9 
CM coding remains controversial and may underestimate the true incidence and burden 
of clinical sepsis (Martin et al., 2003; Rhee et al., 2014).  
Rather than relying on a single coding methodology f r sepsis, this study 
integrated two validated sepsis coding methodologies from Dombrovskiy et al. (2007)’s 
longitudinal study of sepsis hospitalization and mortality and Elixhauser et al.-generated 
septicemia HCUP brief (2011). Because Elixhuaser et al. focused only on septicemia, 
Dombrovskiy’s methodology is incorporated with Elixhauser’s codes to reflect the full 
cascade of sepsis. Therefore, the ICD-9 CM codes of interest ranges from the systemic 
inflammatory response to septic shock, to include varying degrees of sepsis severity.   
The use of an integrated coding paradigm provided a more comprehensive and 
accurate assessment on sepsis, based on the available variables in the data abstract for the 
purpose of this study. To validate this coding scheme, the sepsis diagnosis codes were 
cross-referenced with AHRQ’s (20009) Patient Safety Indicator brief for postoperative 





CM codes present in all three methodologies are considered for this study, with minor 
exceptions. The three excluded ICD-9 CM codes were irrelevant to this study. Elixhauser 
et al.’s use of newborn septicemia is not considered, b cause the study’s working dataset 
only contained patients over the age of 18. These ident fied ICD-9 CM codes exclude 
Dombrovskiy et al.’s categorization of severe sepsis with organ dysfunction codes, since 
this study merely examined the incidence and mortality of all sepsis cases, regardless of 
severity. For future studies that seek to differentiate between sepsis-severity outcomes, it 
would be useful to include the Dombrovskiy’s distinc on of organ dysfunction-sepsis 
cases.  
A similar and simpler literature review process was used to identify ICD-9 CM 
codes for the other emergency conditions. For trauma, two trauma benchmarking studies 
were referenced (Benns, Carr, Kallan & Sims, 2013; Phillips, Clark, Nathens, Shiloach & 
Freel, 2008). For acute ischemic stroke, the study adopted Kokotailo & Hill’s (2005)’s 
suggested stroke codes, while accepting the authors’ n ted slight bias towards more 
severe strokes, since patients with mild symptoms may not seek treatment. Cardiac arrest 
was operationalized through a single ICD-9 code (Carr et al., 2009). STEMI patients 
were identified with Steinberg et al.’s (2008) coding paradigm.  
With the looming ICD-10 compliance deadline approaching, it is important to 
consider the clinical and quality implications of this pervasive coding variability. Under 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, covered entities are required to 
transition to ICD-10 by October 2015 (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2014). 





multistage conditions coding by researchers and clinicians. Coding variability remains an 
area of future study and refinement as this transition unfolds.  
3.5 Measures 
Key variables of interest include: system competition, system affiliation, and 
inpatient mortality for the emergency conditions of interest. These variables were all 
derived from SID, and supplementary hospital characte istics.  
3.6 Outcome Variable: Inpatient Mortality for Emergency Conditions 
The main outcome being studied is inpatient mortality for emergency care 
conditions. The outcomes of mortality are classified as survive or died, rendering it as a 
dichotomous outcome. Therefore, mortality is inherently categorized as a binary variable 
to indicate the patient’s outcome.   
The study considered inpatient mortality from emergency-type admissions, for 
sepsis, trauma, acute ischemic stroke, cardiac arrest and STEMI, as classified by the ICD-
9 CM codes in the medical record’s listed diagnoses from SID. The 2012 Maryland SID 
file lists up to 30 diagnoses for each patient - the study considered all 30 in the analyses. 
Because of the natural disease pathway of sepsis, the condition often emerges after initial 
hospitalization, rather than acting as the principal cause for admission. Therefore, sepsis 
is often listed as a secondary diagnosis instead of primary (Hall et al., 2011). Being able 
to consider all 30 diagnoses in Maryland’s dataset llowed for a more comprehensive 
analysis of the incidence and mortality rates of emergency conditions. Furthermore, it 
provided greater depth to the study by enabling analyses of any interactions between the 
different emergency care sensitive conditions.  
The study examined the case fatality rate, the ratio of cases for the condition of 





referral region. Hospital standardized mortality ratios can be used to assess hospital 
performance (Berthelot, Lang, Quan & Stelfox, 2014), and correlating to this study, 
hospital system performance in HRRs.  
3.7 Key Independent Variable: Competition at the Hospital Referral Region 
Level 
This study defined the local healthcare market at the HRR level. The HRR 
deliniation is useful towards the study’s goals of understanding the association between 
competition and patients’ outcomes, especially when time-sensitive and geographic 
constraints are critical factors. The HRR definition also provides a larger, more systemic 
perspective of the healthcare market, allowing implcations about hospital consolidation 
and care coordination to be ascertained.  
Following the geographical methodology of previous studies of hospital 
consolidation (Cutler & Morton, 2013; Robinson, 2011), the HRR unit provides a 
geographic unit to analyze the local hospital market structures in the state. The 
Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare demarcates 306 HRRs in the national healthcare market, 
three of which are located in Maryland. The 2012 Maryland SID data was mapped to the 
designated Dartmouth HRRs, using the admitting hospital’s zip code to identify the 
patient’s HRR designation, rather than the patient zip code to better reflect healthcare 
utilization patterns and associated outcomes.  
The use of HRRs to define the market area is commonly used in studies of 
regional variation (Wennberg et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2012; O’Hare et al., 2010; Song et 
al., 2010; Robinson, 2011) in quality of care (Fisher et al., 2003). Using a multifaceted 
algorithm of commuting patterns of patients to major referral hospitals (Wennberg & 





markets where patients seek tertiary care (Wennberg & Cooper, 1996). HRRs “contain at 
least one hospital that performs major cardiovascular procedures and neurosurgery” 
(Wennberg & Cooper, 1996). Because the HRR represents a larger healthcare market, 
this study utilized this broader market area definitio  to conduct an in-depth analysis of 
competition among hospital systems.  
3.7.1 Maryland Geography at the Hospital Referral Region Level 
In terms of topography, Maryland is diverse and is naturally divided by the 
Chesapeake Bay, resulting in a natural, geographically-defined HRR on the Eastern 
Shore, Salisbury, and two other HRRs, Baltimore and Takoma Park, on the West side of 
the Bay. Maps of the state’s three HRRs are shown in Figures 1 and 2. The Baltimore 
HRR has the largest resident population (Wennberg & Cooper, 1996). It encompasses 
Baltimore City, the most populated city in the state (U.S. Census Bureau). As the second-
most populated HRR, Takoma Park contains Prince George’s County, which has the 
second-largest population in Maryland. Finally, theSalisbury HRR reflects the 
population patterns of the state’s Eastern shore counties – it is considerably less populous 
than the more metropolitan areas in Maryland (U.S. Census Bureau). Located bayside, 
the Salisbury HRR encompasses more miles of shoreline (Maryland Geological Survey, 
2007). It is geographically isolated from the rest of he state and contains lower rates of 
developed residential and non-residential land thane counties in the Baltimore and 






Figure 3.3. Map of the Baltimore and Takoma Park Hospital Referral Regions. 






Figure 3.4. Map of the Salisbury Hospital Referral Region.  








The following table obtained from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care details the 
HRRs’ population and healthcare characteristics (Wennb rg & Cooper, 1996).  
Hospital Referral Region Resident Population Acute Care Beds per 1000 Expenditures per capita 
Baltimore 2,247,761 3.1 1,116 
Salisbury 305,907 2.8 998 
Takoma Park 778,169 2.7 703 
As the largest and most populous HRR, Baltimore contains seven hospital 
systems and three independent hospitals. The Baltimore HRR encompasses the 
University of Maryland Medical System and Johns Hopkins Health System, which are 
considered to be rivals (Appleby, 2012). There are a total of 23 hospitals in the Baltimore 
HRR, all located within the states. The Takoma Park HRR contains four hospital systems 
and one independent hospital. Finally, the Salisbury HRR contains two hospital systems 
and one independent hospital. It is important to note that the Salisbury HRR contains two 
hospitals located in Delaware as well. Without the availability of Delaware data, these 
out-of-state hospitals were excluded from the study’s parameters.  
Geospatial information from the Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare provided a 
contextual understanding of the HRRs’ healthcare utilization trends.  In the 1992 fiscal 
year, the Baltimore HRR’s Medicare reimbursements per enrollee was $4,481, 
significantly higher than the national average of $3,650. Along the same lines, the HRR 
has more acute care beds, acute hospital employees, regi tered nurses in acute care 
hospital, adjusted total acute care hospital expenditures, physician workforce, specialist 
physicians, and number of medical discharges than other South Atlantic HRRs. These 





resource-intensive and high-spending HRR than other HRRs in the South Atlantic region, 
and particularly when compared to the other HRRs in the state.  
For this study, the competition index was calculated at the HRR level, allowing 
regional variation analyses of hospital system competition and population-level patient 
outcomes. Because emergency care necessitates immediate medical attention, the patient 
is restricted to proximate hospitals, likely enclosed in the geographic bounds of the HRR.  
3.8 Competition Index 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used to quantify the competitive 
environment in each HRR. HHI is the most common measure of competition and used by 
the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. HHI captures the number and 
relative size of firms (Baker, 2001) to describe thmarket competition and inter-market 
variation in competition (Sari, 2002).  
This study calculated the competition index using hospital systems’ market shares 
within the three HRRs. Because the study focused on the impact of hospital system 
competition, the study compares patient outcomes by hospital system rather than 
individual hospitals. Therefore, Holy Cross Hospital in Silver Spring is classified as part 
of the Trinity Health System, Laurel Regional Hospital and Prince George’s Hospital 
Center are both part of Dimensions Healthcare System, MedStar Montgomery Medical 
Center is part of MedStar Health, and Washington Adventist Hospital is part of Adventist 
Healthcare. Doctors Community Hospital operates as the only independent hospital in the 
Takoma Park HRR, in which the study considered an indiv dual entity and unaffiliated 
with a health system. In the Salisbury HRR, it contains three independent hospitals. The 





For the competition index calculation, the whole hospital system is considered to 
better serve the purpose of the study. The use of the hospital system variable provided a 
better indicator of coordination of care as well as evel of market concentration. With the 
focus on care coordination, collaborative hospital systems claim to better serve patients 
and communities through its geographic influence. By deriving the competition index at 
the hospital system level, this study hoped to reflect the true structure and quality of care 
of the local healthcare market.  
The competition index reflects the aggregate hospital systems’ market shares for 
three separate parameters: all inpatient admissions, all inpatient admissions originating 
from the ED, and all inpatient admissions originatig from the ED for the conditions of 
interest. Mathematically, the competition index is the sum of the all hospital systems’ 
squared market shares (Pearlstein et al., 2002). The spectrum of competitiveness in the 
market can be categorized into three categories: Unconcentrated (HHI between 100 and 
1500), moderately concentrated (HHI between 1500 and 2500), highly concentrated (HHI 
above 2500) (Department of Justice, 2014). In essence, the lower the HHI, the more 
competitive the market is. HHI increases as both the numbers of firms in the market 
decreases, and as the disparity in size between the contributing firms increases 
(Department of Justice).  
For the sake of simplicity and enhanced readability, this study translated HHI into 
a zero to one range. Therefore, an HHI of one indicates that there is one single 
monopolistic hospital system dominating the market, and a minimal, if any, level of 





there are a substantial number of providers in the market, representing numerous health 
systems or independent hospitals.  
3.8.1 Modified HHIs 
Considering the innate differences between planned care and emergency care, this 
study sought to explore the role of competition specifically in the emergency care sector. 
Through an original modified-HHI paradigm, this study manipulated hospital system 
market shares to fit the emergency care and disease-specific contexts, subsequently 
producing varying levels of competition. The study’s use and creation of modified-HHI 
methodology is novel for healthcare sectors, especially for emergency care.  
In this study, the modified-HHI approach funneled the competition measure from 
a general portrayal of health systems’ market shares in the HRR to specifically assess 
emergency department admissions of interest. This provided a preliminary approach 
towards understanding the level of competition for emergency care in contrast to the 
overall inpatient system. As the emergency departmen  continues to evolve, the modified-
HHI methodology can provide a juxtaposition between ED and inpatient admissions in 
general. 
To extend the use of this modified-HHI methodology, this study calculated 
disease-specific HHIs for the emergency care sensitive conditions of interest rather than 
just analyzing discharges for all conditions. Furthe more, HHI calculation for the five 
emergency care conditions provided for an analysis of the potential variation in 
competition for different diseases. The modified-HHI methodology lends a more narrow 





assess the impact of competition for a discrete population and conditions of interest, 
pediatrics for instance, can utilize this study’s modified-HHI paradigm for greater insight. 
3.8.2 Calculation of HHI 
HHI calculation requires determining the market shares of hospitals or health 
systems in the specified HRR. The market share of each facility is based on the number 
of discharges. The following equation depicts this process.  
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The market share of each facility is squared, and the resulting amounts are then 
totaled for the HRR, resulting in the subsequent equation.  
  	
     	       	
  !  	   " # 1%  	 
The HHI reflects the level of competition in the HRR, suggesting that one region 
may be more competitive than another. The facility market shares were modified to 
reflect the various competition and disease parameters, to produce more ED-specific 
competition indices. These considerations for the modified-HHI methodology is shown in 
Figure 4. The of the use modified-HHIs provides an analytical visualization of 





Figure 3.5. Calculation of Competition Index. First, the inpatient admissions are 
considered, then only admissions originating from the Emergency Department, and 
then the condition-specific parameters.  
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To diminish the potential for confounding, the regrssion analyses controlled for a 
variety of patient, episode, and provider characteristics. Potential confounders were 
selected based on literature and included patient- and hospital-level characteristics. Given 
that variable mortality rates may reflect differencs in study populations and settings, 
rather than a lack of association, it is necessary to take these covariates into account.  
3.9.1 Patient-Level Covariates 
Patient-case mix and demographic covariates included gender, age, race, and 
median income quartile based on the patient zip code. Using information retrieved from 
the SID, the variables of gender, age, and race werincluded to account for possible 
differences in the HRR study populations’ in demographic profiles. The median income 
quartile of the patient’s zip code was defined in four quadrants: 0 – 25 percentile, 26 – 50 
percentile, 51 – 75 percentile, and 76 – 100 percentile.  
In this study, weekend admission was considered as a patient-level variable. 
Weekday and weekend admission has been identified as a risk factor for patients 
presenting with unplanned critical illness, resulting n variability in emergency care 
outcomes (Carr, Reilly, Schwab, Branas, Geiger & Wiebe, 2011; Bell & Redelmeir, 
2011; Shulkin, 2008; Cram, Hillis, Barnett & Rosenthal, 2004).  
Because comorbidity is an important confounder in clinical and epidemiological 
studies (Schneeweiss, Seeger, Maclure. Wang, Avorn & Glynn, 2001), controlling for 
patient comorbidity allows a more accurate analysis u ng the claims-based data. 
Comorbidity measures were validated by “how well they predict worse health outcomes, 
health care utilization, and increased health care expenditures” (Schneeweiss et al., 





Index (Charlson, Szatrowski, Peterson & Gold, 1994). The AHRQ-sponsored 
supplemental comorbidity software provided the Elixhauser Comorbidity algorithm to 
develop measures for risk-adjustment. Combining the C arlson and Elixhauser 
Comorbidity Indices enabled comparisons of mortality among the different conditions, 
while controlling for underlying health status and illness severity.  
3.9.2 Hospital Characteristics as Covariates 
The AHA Directory and HCUP AHA Linkage file supplemnts the SID with 
hospital-level information, including bed size, teaching status, type of control, and 
hospital affiliation, allowing more in-depth empirical analysis. In the context of this 
study, hospital characteristics may act as confounders and proxies for hospital quality.  
For the hospital characteristic variable of “type of c ntrol,” the study referred to 
the AHD profiles. This study supplemented the AHD information by examining the 
HSCRC Community Benefits Report Narratives as well. The ACA requires designated 
non-profit hospitals to submit a Community Health Needs Assessment (CNHA) and 
HSCRC collects these reports. The CNHA report includes all 32 hospitals captured in the 
analysis, indicating a not-for-profit status. However, one variation to note is Johns 
Hopkins Bayview Hospital. AHD lists Bayview as private whereas the AHA profile lists 
as a not-for-profit. Because of the discrepancy, the evidence of the AHA profile and 
CHNA report suggests that Bayview is a not-for-profit rganization. In the overall 
scheme of the analysis, the other 31 hospitals are all listed as not-for-profit, rather than 
private, relegating it difficult to use the “type of control” variable as an adjustor in the 
analysis. In terms of an executive decision, this study categorized Johns Hopkins 





of CNHA documents and the AHA classification. Because of the uniform non-profit 
status, hospital ownership was not a relevant control in this study.   
The Salisbury HRR is on a significantly smaller scale than Baltimore, 
subsequently the Salisbury HRR lacks some hospital characteristics that are important 
controls in this study. Salisbury does not contain any teaching hospitals or hospitals 
affiliated with a health system. In this study, teaching status acts as a hospital quality 
characteristic that may confound and affect mortality. Teaching status may be correlated 
with competitiveness as well (Pines, 2006). Additionally, the Salisbury HRR is 
comprised of independent hospitals. However, this study aims to study the role of 
competition and quality, for which hospital system affiliation may impact one or both 
variables. Because the overall objective of this analysis is to examine the relationship 
between competition and mortality for emergency care conditions, the inclusion of 
teaching status and hospital system affiliation as controls facilitates a better 
understanding of the impact of hospital characteristics on patient outcomes and quality of 
care.  
The number of hospitals categorized as teaching and affiliated with a hospital 
system varies by the HRR. Small and differentiated sizes led to unstable estimates of the 
association between hospital characteristics and the study outcome. In using teaching 
status and hospital system affiliation, the effect of the hospital characteristics and stability 
of the estimates are minimized.  
3.9.2 Creation of Binary Covariates 
For the regression analysis, the categorical covariates were transformed into 





numerical relationship with one another. Therefore, th  creation of dummy variables 
converts the variable into a binary variable for more accurate statistical analyses (Pasta, 
2009). For nominal variables with multiple levels, including race and median income 
quartile, binary variables can be created to represent each level or category.  
 Gender, race, payer, urban or rural patient locatin, median income percentiles of 
patient zip code, hospital system affiliation, weeknd admission, and teaching status are 
depicted as binary variables in the regression analyses, enabling the use of a single 
regression equation to represent the associated groups.  
3.9.3 Creation of Binary HHI  
Initially, the main explanatory variable, HHI, began s a continuous variable and 
became categorical, namely three regions. The continuous competition index can be 
scaled from zero to one, reflecting the spectrum of competition in the local healthcare 
market. Preliminary analyses using the continuous cmpetition index yielded convoluted 
and insignificant results, suggesting further refinment of the competition index. In the 
scope of this study, Maryland encompasses three HRRs - significantly limiting the ability 
of HHI to be used as a continuous variable and therefore supporting its transformation 
into a binary variable.  
Accordingly for analytical purposes, binary HHI variables were created. The 
binary HHI variable distinguished between high and low level of competition in the 
HRRs. While the three continuous modified-HHI variables represented the differing 
levels of competition in the inpatient, emergency, and disease-specific contexts, the 
binary high and low competition categories allows more accurate assessment of the 





For future studies that incorporate a larger scope of geographic markets across 
states or regions, the use of the continuous modified-HHIs may provide a more 
comprehensive approach because of the greater numbers of HRRs and associated 
competition indices. Regardless, this study’s various HHI-adjustments revealed the 
ability of the competition index to fit a variety of study specifications.   
 3.10 Statistical Analysis 
For this study, the sample means and standard deviations were calculated to 
provide descriptive statistics of population characteristics within the three HRRs. A 
Pearson’s chi-square test was utilized to compare the distributions to ascertain any 
significant differences in ECSC mortality among theHRRs.  
Two-sample t-tests were conducted to assess the demographic and hospital 
facility differences and any significant differences among HRRs. Two HRRs were 
modeled simultaneously in the two-sample t-test, providing an examination of the 
Baltimore HRR against Salisbury HRR, Baltimore against Takoma Park, and Salisbury 
and Takoma Park. The associated means, standard deviations, and p-values indicated any 
significant differences between the regions to reveal the makeup of the regions. For 
example, a significant difference in bed size betwen Baltimore and Salisbury suggested 
that it may be a potential confounder; therefore, inclusion as a covariate as a control for 
the regressions.  
An initial analysis using a Chi-Square Test compared th  binary competition 
variable with mortality. Binary logistic regressions with controls were conducted to 
examine the association between hospital system competition and inpatient mortality for 





the five conditions. The main predictor in this study was the binary regional competition 
variable, as defined by the 2012 Maryland SID file and Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare.  
For these models, the use of the binary competition variable is framed that the 
high level of competition is the control and the low level of competition is the reference 
group. The stepwise regression models included covariates for case-mix, severity, and 
hospital quality adjustments. The use of covariates tenuates biasness from potential 
confounders, and allows a better understanding of the effect of solely competition on 
inpatient mortality. In the stepwise regressions, the covariates are added by groups 
relating to patient demographics, severity of disease, nd hospital characteristics to study 
the effect of different sets of controls on inpatien  mortality. The use of stepwise 
regressions provided insight on the interactions betwe n the patient- and hospital-level 
covariate domains, regional competition, and mortality. Table 2.1 outlines the specific 
covariates included in each model.   
Model Covariates Included 
Basic Competition binary  
Demographics Age, age squared, gender binary, racial bin ry  
Comorbidity Elixhauser and Charlson Comorbidity Indices 
Demographics+ Demographics, payer binary, urban, income quartile binary 
Demographics+, Comorbidity Demographics+, comorbidity 
Facility Bed size, teaching status 
Facility+ Hospital fixed effects 
Demographics+. Comorbidity, Facility Demographics+, comorbidity, facility  
 
The stepwise regression included seven models: basic, demographics, 
comorbidity, demographics +, facility, facility + and demographics + comorbidity and 
facility. These different models included varying characteristics that may confound the 
outcome. The basic model regression only includes th  binary competition variable. For 





gender binary variable, and racial binary variables as covariates. The comorbidity model 
includes the binary competition variable and Elixhauser and Charlson Comorbidity 
Indices as covariates. The demographics+ model builds pon the original demographics 
step, and adds payer, urban, and income quartile binary variables. Furthermore, the 
demographics+, comorbidity model combines the covariates in those two models. The 
facility model focuses on hospital characteristics and includes the binary competition 
variable with the bed size and teaching status of the hospital. Finally, the demographics+, 
comorbidity, facility model integrates the covariates in those three models together, to 
provide a summation of all listed covariates.  
The facility+ model used hospital fixed effects, to control for unobservable 
characteristics at the hospital level. The hospital fixed effects model created a binary 
variable for each hospital. However, this may bias the results because it essentially 
controls for hospital quality, which may be related o the mortality outcome.  
3.11 Instrumental Analysis of Hospital System Affilation 
This study serves as a natural experiment, in which the Maryland All-Payer 
Model’s regulated payment system have created an eco omic environment somewhat 
akin to a randomized experiment (Angrist & Krueger, 2001). Through the state’s uniform 
rate-setting policy, the independent variable of competition is essentially configured to be 
volume-based, rather than price or quality-driven. This study exploits the state of 
Maryland’s payment system to identify empirically the impact of uniform-rate setting and 
hospital competition on inpatient mortality for unplanned, critical illness.  
In the state of Maryland, the All-Payer Model sets uniform rates for hospitals; 
therefore, competitive mechanisms in the state’s healt care market are different than 





plane where hospitals cannot compete based on price. As a result, quantity is the only 
factor that fluctuates for hospitals, creating an environment of primarily volume-based 
competition. The process of determining hospital competition is affected by the uniform 
payment system and correlated with the study’s outcome of inpatient mortality.    
The possibility of inconsistent parameter estimation exists due to a possible 
endogenous regressor. An inconsistent estimate, produced by the stepwise regressions, 
may only measure the magnitude of the association, rather than the association’s 
magnitude in conjunction with the direction of the causation (Cameron, 2013). For 
example, an odds ratio point estimate may reveal a significant association between 
contrasting regional levels of competition and mortality, but not necessarily in the correct 
direction. As a result, statistical effectiveness is misplaced and the results generated are 
inconsistent (Bowden & Turkington, 1990).  
 By using instrumental variables analysis, the multivariable logistic regressions 
can show more consistent parameter estimations to overc me measurement errors in the 
explanatory variable (Angrist & Krueger, 2001) and subsequently determine the true 
value of the parameter. An understanding of hospital competition activity supports the 
premise of competition as an endogenous variable – competition acts as the main 
explanatory variable but is jointly determined by the study’s dependent variable 
(Verbeek, 2008) of mortality, reinforcing the need to identify a logical instrumental 
variable and re-estimate the models accounting for this previously unaccounted for 
variable. Hospital system affiliation is largely correlated with hospital competition; 
larger, consolidated systems create asymmetry in market shares, and subsequently reduce 





hospital system affiliation was included as an additional covariate to indicate facilities 
belonging to a hospital system. As an instrumental variable, this new variable of hospital 
system affiliation should be correlated with the endogenous variable of competition, and 
potentially correlated with the study’s outcome variable, but only through the endogenous 
competition variable.   
3.12 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation 
To test the endogeneity of this relationship between hospital system affiliation, 
hospital system competition, and inpatient mortality, 2-Stage Least Squares Estimation 
and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test were used. For the 2-Stage Least Squares Estimation 
(2SLS), the One-Stage Least Square (OLS) estimates were first produced for a condition 
of interest, then the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates were subsequently 
calculated as well. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test for Instrumental Endogeneity was 
used to validate the use of instrumental variables analysis. The 2SLS estimate uses 
instruments to control for possible endogeneity of the regressor, and if endogenous, then 
the OLS estimates will be inconsistent with the 2SLS results, so the two estimates will be 
different.  
3.13 Hausman Test of Endogeneity 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test for instrumental endogeneity was used to test the 
potentially endogenous variable of hospital competition. Because the dataset only 
contains observations from the 2012 year, panel data analysis for testing endogeneity 
cannot be used, as it is created to model parameters ov  time. For subsequent analyses 
with multiple years of SID data, the panel data model analyses will be a better fit.  
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However, this study only focuses on one potential instrumental variable, hospital 
system affiliation, rendering the first derivative of the coefficients unnecessary. 
Therefore, the Durban-Wu-Hausman test equation is simplified for this study’s purposes. 
Fortunately, the Hausman test is particularly easy to calculate by hand because there is 
only one component of the parameter tested, opposed t  the use of multiple instrumental 






The OLS estimates, represented by 24 and ̃ and the 2SLS regression estimates, 23 
and ̂, for the systems’ coefficients for the different conditions can be used in this 
equation to calculate the Hausman Test Statistic and test for endogeneity, after 
completing a 2SLS estimation.  
Instrumental variable analysis was used to specifically address potential bias due 
to hospital system affiliation, which could not be controlled with the existing hospital 
characteristic control variables. Instrumental variables can be used to identify a causal 
effect of a treatment on outcomes, but requires an instrument that correlates with the 
independent variable of interest, hospital system co petition in the HRR, but does not 
directly affect the outcome of mortality, except through its influence on the likelihood of 
hospital system affiliation. In essence, an instrumental variable is correlated to the 
endogenous main independent variable, hospital competition, but uncorrelated with the 





and competition are correlated, therefore impacting mortality of emergency care 
conditions through the endogenous variable of competition.  
Instrumental variables analysis is a quasi-experimental technique that mimics 
randomness, allowing more accurate results to be extrapolated. Since instrumental 
variable properties represent consistency and convergence properties, this instrument was 
applied to the stepwise binary logistic regressions f interest to yield more accurate 
parameter estimates.  
4: Results 
4.1 Computation 
All statistical analyses were performed using SAS 9.3 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, 
NC). Two-tailed statistical significance level, α, was defined at 0.05.  
4.2 Binary Competition Measure 
Under the binary competition approach, the competition index becomes an 
independent dummy variable to reflect the high and low levels of competition. With a 
fixed reference group, a binary variable facilitated he interpretation of results by 
comparing an HRR with high competition against an HRR with low competition. For the 
purpose of this study, the Takoma Park and Baltimore HRRs were grouped together in 
the low competition group. Takoma Park has an overall HHI of 0.253 for all inpatient 
admissions, comparable to Baltimore’s HHI of 0.181. In contrast to this, Salisbury’s HHI 
is 0.753, reflecting a low competition market.  The various modified HHIs are shown in 
Table 4.1. By analyzing the relative change in mortality, the binary competition variable 
enabled interpretations in the scope of competition level and greater or less likelihood of 





 Baltimore Salisbury Takoma Park 
HHI for All Inpatient Admissions  0.181 0.753 0.253 
HHI for All Inpatient Admissions, Originating from ED 0.191 0.689 0.210 
HHI for All Inpatient Admissions, Originating from ED, with Sepsis 0.185 0.614 0.249 
HHI for All Inpatient Admissions, Originating from ED, with Trauma 0.273 0.629 0.272 
HHI for All Inpatient Admissions, Originating from ED, with Acute 
Ischemic Stroke 
0.216 0.639 0.209 
HHI for All Inpatient Admissions, Originating from ED, with Cardiac 
Arrest 
0.189 0.771 0.243 
HHI for All Inpatient Admissions, Originating from ED, with STEMI 0.238 0.902 0.253 
Table 4.1. Modified Competition Index Measures for the HRRs by Condition.  
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive summary statistics for the variables and covariates were examined for 
the five emergency conditions. From 695,207 observations, 70,677 cases were identified 
within the study’s parameters of the disease conditions of interest originating from the 
emergency department. This study also excluded any episodes that had missing patient-
level information. Sepsis and trauma reported relatively similar case volumes, with 
26,291 and 28,216 cases respectively. On the other hand, cardiac arrest and STEMI 
experienced relatively similar, and lower, volumes of 2,125 and 2,817 respectively. The 
study’s analytical dataset also included 11,228 stroke observations.  
The study population’s descriptive statistics, stratified by condition and HRR, are 






















Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for Sepsis.  
 
Condition = Sepsis  Baltimore (N= 18,593)     Salisbury (N=1,439)     Takoma Park (N=6,259)    
 Mean  Std Dev Pr > |t|  Mean  Std Dev Pr > |t|  Mean  Std Dev Pr > |t| 
Died during hospitalization 0.12  0.33 <.0001 0.13  0.33 <.0001  0.12  0.32  <.0001 
Age 63  19 <.0001 67  17 <.0001   64  20 <.0001 
Female 0.50  0.50  <.0001 0.48  0.50  <.0001  0.53  0.50  <.0001 
Admission day is a weekend 0.26  0.44  <.0001 0.28  0.45  <.0001  0.26  0.44  <.0001 
Bed Size 366  214 <.0001 271  130 <.0001  289  126 <.0001 
Competition Index for all inpatient 0.18  - <.0001 0.75   -   <.0001  0.25   -   <.0001 
Competition Index for inpatient from ED 0.19  - <.0001 0.70   -   <.0001  0.21   -  <.0001 
Competition Index for Sepsis 0.19  - <.0001 0.61   -   <.0001  0.24   -   <.0001 
Elixhauser index 10.63  10.61  <.0001 11.16   9.93  <.0001  9.27   8.53  <.0001 
Charlson index 7.79  9.66  <.0001 7.69   8.44  <.0001  6.52   7.90  <.0001 
White 0.60  0.49  <.0001 0.74   0.44  <.0001  0.34   0.48  <.0001 
Black 0.35  0.48  <.0001 0.23   0.42  <.0001  0.50   0.50  <.0001 
Hispanic 0.01  0.11  <.0001 0.02   0.13  <.0001  0.09   0.29  <.0001 
Asian 0.01  0.11  <.0001 0.00   0.04  0.1574  0.03   0.18 <.0001 
Native American 0.00  0.04  <.0001 0.00   0.03  0.3175  0.01   0.08 <.0001 
Other 0.02  0.13  <.0001 0.01   0.11  <.0001  0.03   0.17  <.0001 
Medicare 0.60   0.49  <.0001 0.68   0.47  <.0001  0.58   0.49  <.0001 
Medicaid 0.16   0.37  <.0001 0.07   0.26  <.0001  0.14   0.34  <.0001 
Private 0.22   0.42  <.0001 0.23   0.42  <.0001  0.27   0.44  <.0001 
Other 0.02   0.14  <.0001 0.01   0.09  0.0003  0.01   0.11  <.0001 
Urban 0.97   0.16  <.0001 0.54   0.50  <.0001  1.00   0.07  <.0001 
Rural 0.03   0.16  <.0001 0.46   0.50  <.0001  0.00   0.07  <.0001 
Income percentile 0-25 0.18   0.39  <.0001 0.15   0.36  <.0001  0.03   0.17  <.0001 
Income percentile 26-50 0.15   0.36  <.0001 0.53   0.50  <.0001  0.02   0.14  <.0001 
Income percentile 51-75 0.26   0.44  <.0001 0.28   0.45  <.0001  0.33   0.47  <.0001 
Income percentile 76-100 0.40   0.49  <.0001 0.03   0.18  <.0001  0.62   0.49  <.0001 
Hospital System 0.90   0.29  <.0001  -  - -  0.84   0.36  <.0001 





















Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics for Trauma 
 
Condition = Trauma  Baltimore (N= 22,446)     Salisbury (N=1,527)     Takoma Park (N=4,234)    
 Mean  Std Dev Pr > |t|  Mean  Std Dev Pr > |t|  Mean  Std Dev Pr > |t| 
Died during hospitalization 0.03 0.17 <.0001 0.02 0.15 <.0001 0.02 0.15 <.0001 
Age 57 25 <.0001 66 21 <.0001 60 24 <.0001 
Female 0.46 0.50 <.0001 0.54 0.50 <.0001 0.49 0.50 <.0001 
Admission day is a weekend 0.30 0.46 <.0001 0.28 0.45 <.0001 0.29 0.45 <.0001 
Sepsis 0.04 0.20 <.0001 0.07 0.25 <.0001 0.07 0.26 <.0001 
Trauma 1.00 0.00 . 1.00 0.00 . 1.00 0.00 . 
Stroke 0.03 0.17 <.0001 0.06 0.24 <.0001 0.03 0.16 <.0001 
Cardiac Arrest 0.01 0.10 <.0001 0.01 0.12 <.0001 0.01 0.09 <.0001 
STEMI 0.00 0.06 <.0001 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 
Bed Size 480 240 <.0001 275 127 <.0001 268 99 <.0001 
Competition Index for all inpatient 0.18 0.00 <.0001 0.75 0.00 <.0001 0.25 0.00 <.0001 
Competition Index for inpatient from ED 0.19 0.00 <.0001 0.70 0.00 <.0001 0.21 0.00 <.0001 
Competition Index for Trauma 0.27 0.00 <.0001 0.63 0.00 <.0001 0.27 0.00 <.0001 
Elixhauser index 5.36 7.93 <.0001 6.77 7.90 <.0001 5.30 6.62 <.0001 
Charlson index 3.34 6.50 <.0001 4.35 6.69 <.0001 3.29 6.09 <.0001 
White 0.66 0.47 <.0001 0.83 0.38 <.0001 0.46 0.50 <.0001 
Black 0.29 0.45 <.0001 0.12 0.33 <.0001 0.41 0.49 <.0001 
Hispanic 0.03 0.16 <.0001 0.03 0.17 <.0001 0.08 0.27 <.0001 
Asian 0.01 0.09 <.0001 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.15 <.0001 
Native American 0.00 0.05 <.0001 0.00 0.03 0.32 0.00 0.06 0.00 
Other 0.02 0.14 <.0001 0.02 0.13 <.0001 0.02 0.15 <.0001 
Medicare 0.45 0.50 <.0001 0.60 0.49 <.0001 0.48 0.50 <.0001 
Medicaid 0.17 0.37 <.0001 0.06 0.25 <.0001 0.14 0.35 <.0001 
Private 0.33 0.47 <.0001 0.31 0.46 <.0001 0.36 0.48 <.0001 
Other 0.05 0.22 <.0001 0.02 0.15 <.0001 0.02 0.13 <.0001 
Urban 0.95 0.22 <.0001 0.53 0.50 <.0001 0.98 0.13 <.0001 
Rural 0.05 0.22 <.0001 0.47 0.50 <.0001 0.02 0.13 <.0001 
Income percentile 0-25 0.18 0.38 <.0001 0.17 0.38 <.0001 0.04 0.20 <.0001 
Income percentile 26-50 0.15 0.35 <.0001 0.45 0.50 <.0001 0.02 0.15 <.0001 
Income percentile 51-75 0.26 0.44 <.0001 0.30 0.46 <.0001 0.32 0.47 <.0001 
Income percentile 76-100 0.41 0.49 <.0001 0.08 0.27 <.0001 0.62 0.49 <.0001 
Hospital System 0.92 0.25 <.0001 0.00 0.00 . 0.89 0.30 <.0001 


















Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics for Acute Ischemic Stroke.  
 
Condition = Stroke  Baltimore (N=8,569)     Salisbury (N=961)     Takoma Park (N=1,698)    
 Mean  Std Dev Pr > |t|  Mean  Std Dev Pr > |t|  Mean  Std Dev Pr > |t| 
Died during hospitalization 0.04 0.20 <.0001 0.04 0.18 <.0001 0.04 0.21 <.0001 
Age 71 15 <.0001 73 13 <.0001 72 14 <.0001 
Female 0.53 0.50 <.0001 0.51 0.50 <.0001 0.57 0.49 <.0001 
Admission day is a weekend 0.25 0.43 <.0001 0.25 0.43 <.0001 0.26 0.44 <.0001 
Bed Size 361 201 <.0001 279 125 <.0001 270 112 <.0001 
Competition Index for all inpatient 0.18 - <.0001 0.75 - <.0001 0.25 - <.0001 
Competition Index for inpatient from ED 0.19 - <.0001 0.70 - <.0001 0.21 - - 
Competition Index for Stroke 0.22 - <.0001 0.64 - <.0001 0.21 - - 
Elixhauser index 7.77 7.81 <.0001 7.47 6.83 <.0001 7.22 6.65 <.0001 
Charlson index 6.83 7.21 <.0001 6.63 6.80 <.0001 6.34 6.80 <.0001 
White 0.63 0.48 <.0001 0.78 0.41 <.0001 0.37 0.48 <.0001 
Black 0.33 0.47 <.0001 0.19 0.39 <.0001 0.51 0.50 <.0001 
Hispanic 0.02 0.14 <.0001 0.02 0.14 <.0001 0.06 0.23 <.0001 
Asian 0.01 0.09 <.0001 0.00 0.03 0.3176 0.04 0.19 <.0001 
Native American 0.00 0.04 0.0005 0.00 0.03 0.3176 0.00 0.04 0.0833 
Other 0.01 0.11 <.0001 0.01 0.09 0.0046 0.02 0.15 <.0001 
Medicare 0.70 0.46 <.0001 0.76 0.43 <.0001 0.68 0.47 <.0001 
Medicaid 0.09 0.29 <.0001 0.04 0.19 <.0001 0.09 0.28 <.0001 
Private 0.19 0.40 <.0001 0.19 0.39 <.0001 0.23 0.42 <.0001 
Other 0.02 0.13 <.0001 0.01 0.10 0.0015 0.00 0.07 0.0046 
Urban 0.95 0.22 <.0001 0.53 0.50 <.0001 1.00 0.05 <.0001 
Rural 0.05 0.22 <.0001 0.47 0.50 <.0001 0.00 0.05 0.0253 
Income percentile 0-25 0.16 0.37 <.0001 0.17 0.38 <.0001 0.02 0.13 <.0001 
Income percentile 26-50 0.15 0.35 <.0001 0.48 0.50 <.0001 0.03 0.17 <.0001 
Income percentile 51-75 0.29 0.45 <.0001 0.30 0.46 <.0001 0.35 0.48 <.0001 
Income percentile 76-100 0.41 0.49 <.0001 0.04 0.20 <.0001 0.60 0.49 <.0001 
Hospital System 0.91 0.27 <.0001 0.00 0.00 - 0.82 0.38 <.0001 




Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics for Cardiac Arrest.  
Condition = Cardiac Arrest  Baltimore (N= 1,174)    Salisbury (N=166)  
  
 Takoma Park (N=345)  
  
 Mean  Std Dev Pr > |t|  Mean  Std Dev Pr > |t|  Mean  Std Dev Pr > |t|  
Died during hospitalization 0.63 0.48 <.0001 0.57 0.50 <.0001 0.61 0.49 <.0001 
Age 63 19 <.0001 64 17 <.0001 68 16 <.0001 
Female 0.44 0.50 <.0001 0.41 0.49 <.0001 0.46 0.50 <.0001 
Admission day is a weekend 0.26 0.44 <.0001 0.31 0.47 <.0001 0.27 0.44 <.0001 
Bed Size 401 224 <.0001 308 101 <.0001 288 108 <.0001 
Competition Index for all inpatient 0.18 - . 0.75 - - 0.25 - - 
Competition Index for inpatient from ED 0.19 - <.0001 0.70 - - 0.21 - - 
Competition Index for Cardiac Arrest 0.19 - <.0001 0.77 - - 0.24 - - 
Elixhauser index 8.38 8.96 <.0001 9.34 9.24 <.0001 8.38 6.88 <.0001 
Charlson index 6.51 8.59 <.0001 6.93 8.91 <.0001 6.96 8.00 <.0001 
White 0.54 0.50 <.0001 0.67 0.47 <.0001 0.26 0.44 <.0001 
Black 0.42 0.49 <.0001 0.28 0.45 <.0001 0.62 0.49 <.0001 
Hispanic 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.24 <.0001 
Asian 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.32 0.03 0.18 0.00 
Native American 0.00 0.04 0.16 0.00 0.00 . 0.01 0.08 0.16 
Other 0.02 0.14 <.0001 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.16 0.00 
Medicare 0.57 0.49 <.0001 0.63 0.49 <.0001 0.62 0.49 <.0001 
Medicaid 0.18 0.38 <.0001 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.11 0.31 <.0001 
Private 0.23 0.42 <.0001 0.29 0.45 <.0001 0.27 0.44 <.0001 
Other 0.01 0.12 <.0001 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.00 0.00 - 
Urban 0.97 0.16 <.0001 0.53 0.50 <.0001 0.99 0.08 <.0001 
Rural 0.03 0.16 <.0001 0.47 0.50 <.0001 0.01 0.08 0.16 
Income percentile 0-25 0.24 0.43 <.0001 0.16 0.36 <.0001 0.04 0.19 0.00 
Income percentile 26-50 0.16 0.36 <.0001 0.49 0.50 <.0001 0.03 0.16 0.00 
Income percentile 51-75 0.25 0.43 <.0001 0.29 0.45 <.0001 0.39 0.49 <.0001 
Income percentile 76-100 0.35 0.48 <.0001 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.55 0.50 <.0001 
Hospital System 0.91 0.27 <.0001 0.00 0.00 - 0.86 0.34 <.0001 




Baltimore (N = 2,173) Salisbury (N = 247) Takoma Park (N = 397) 
Condition = STEMI Mean Std Dev Pr > |t| Mean Std Dev Pr > |t| Mean Std Dev Pr > |t| 
Died during hospitalization 0.12 0.32 <.0001 0.13 0.34 <.0001 0.15 0.36 <.0001 
Age 67 15 <.0001 67 14 <.0001 67 15 <.0001 
Female 0.41 0.49 <.0001 0.38 0.49 <.0001 0.38 0.49 <.0001 
Admission day is a weekend 0.27 0.44 <.0001 0.30 0.46 <.0001 0.27 0.45 <.0001 
Admission type 1.00 0.00 - 1.00 0.00 - 1.00 0.00 - 
Bed Size 360 200 <.0001 332 66 <.0001 302 109 <.0001 
Competition Index for all inpatient 0.18 - <.0001 0.75 - - 0.25 0.00 - 
Competition Index for inpatient from ED 0.19 - <.0001 0.70 - - 0.21 0.00 - 
Competition Index for STEMI 0.24 - <.0001 0.90 - - 0.25 0.00 - 
Elixhauser index 7.44 9.30 <.0001 5.86 6.91 <.0001 6.41 7.61 <.0001 
Charlson index 7.06 9.45 <.0001 5.39 6.50 <.0001 5.76 7.13 <.0001 
White 0.69 0.46 <.0001 0.77 0.42 <.0001 0.39 0.49 <.0001 
Black 0.26 0.44 <.0001 0.16 0.37 <.0001 0.45 0.50 <.0001 
Hispanic 0.01 0.12 <.0001 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.09 0.29 <.0001 
Asian 0.01 0.10 <.0001 0.00 0.06 0.32 0.05 0.21 <.0001 
Native American 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 - 0.02 0.12 0.01 
Other 0.02 0.15 <.0001 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.05 
Medicare 0.55 0.50 <.0001 0.56 0.50 <.0001 0.53 0.50 <.0001 
Medicaid 0.10 0.30 <.0001 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.08 0.26 <.0001 
Private 0.33 0.47 <.0001 0.38 0.49 <.0001 0.38 0.49 <.0001 
Other 0.03 0.16 <.0001 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 
Urban 0.95 0.22 <.0001 0.45 0.50 <.0001 0.99 0.07 <.0001 
Rural 0.05 0.22 <.0001 0.55 0.50 <.0001 0.01 0.07 0.16 
Income percentile 0-25 0.14 0.34 <.0001 0.18 0.38 <.0001 0.02 0.15 0.00 
Income percentile 26-50 0.14 0.35 <.0001 0.43 0.50 <.0001 0.02 0.14 0.00 
Income percentile 51-75 0.28 0.45 <.0001 0.31 0.46 <.0001 0.31 0.46 <.0001 
Income percentile 76-100 0.44 0.50 <.0001 0.09 0.28 <.0001 0.65 0.48 <.0001 
Hospital System 0.91 0.27 <.0001 0.00 0.00 - 0.86 0.34 <.0001 
Teaching hospital 0.90 0.30 <.0001 0.00 0.00 - 0.90 0.30 <.0001 





There are differences in mortality depending on the condition. Cardiac arrest has 
the highest mortality with means of 0.63, 0.57, and0.61 for Baltimore, Salisbury and 
Takoma Park respectively. Sepsis and STEMI have similar ortalities. For both 
Baltimore and Salisbury, sepsis mortality means were 0.12 and STEMI mortality means 
were 0.13. For Takoma Park, sepsis mortality was 0.12 and STEMI was a bit higher, at 
0.15. Trauma mortality was lowest in all three regions, with means of 0.03, 0.02, and 
0.02 for Baltimore, Salisbury, and Takoma Park respectively. Mortality for acute 
ischemic stroke was also relatively low, with the av rage of 0.04 for all three regions.  
The average age for all of the conditions was 60 years old, with the lowest of 57 
years old for trauma patients in Baltimore. Overall, trauma patients presented with the 
lowest average age out of the conditions, ranging from 57 years old in Baltimore to 66 
years old in Salisbury. Stroke patients had the highest average age, from 71 years old in 
Baltimore, 73 in Salisbury, and 72 in Takoma Park.  
 Overall, the distribution of gender for all conditions and HRRs is relatively 
uniform. The only exception is there are slightly fewer female STEMI cases in all HRRs, 
with a mean of 0.41 for Baltimore and 0.03 for Salisbury and Takoma Park, compared to 
means of approximate 0.5 for the other conditions.  
 The study’s analytical dataset allowed comparisons of one condition to another, 
stratified by HRR. Cardiac arrest observations included sepsis and trauma diagnoses as 
well. Diagnoses of both cardiac arrest and sepsis were averaged at 0.32, 0.3, and 0.49 for 
Baltimore, Salisbury, and Takoma Park. Cases of both cardiac arrest and trauma were 





The study populations for all conditions in Baltimore and Salisbury are 
predominately White, comprising of over 50% of the case volume. The second largest 
racial group for Baltimore and Salisbury is African-American. In contrast to this, 
African-Americans make up the largest racial group in Takoma Park, with Whites as the 
second largest group.  
The Baltimore and Takoma Park HRRs are comprised of nearly all patients from 
urban areas with means of 0.97 and higher, whereas only half of Salisbury patients are 
from urban areas, with means around 0.53. These location patterns are reflected in all five 
of the conditions examined. Patients listing Medicare s the primary payer comprise of a 
large share of admissions for all conditions.  
There was a large amount of variation in comorbidity measures among different 
conditions, but not by HRR, with the exception of STEMI. For all the conditions, the 
Elixhauser Comorbidity Measure had higher means than e Charlson Comorbidity 
Index. Sepsis had the highest means among the conditions, with the regional means 
ranging from 9.26 to 11.16 for the Elixhauser measure and 6.52 to 7.79 for the Charlson 
Index. Cardiac arrest also had high comorbidity means; with regional means of 8.38 to 
9.34 for the Elixhauser measure and 6.51 to 6.96 for the Charlson Index. The regional 
means for acute ischemic stroke were between 7.22 and 7.77 for the Elixhauser measure 
and 6.34 to 6.83 for the Charlson Index. Trauma had slightly lower comorbidity means, 
perhaps due to its truly unforeseen nature. The regional means for trauma were 5.3 to 
6.77 for the Elixhauser measure and 3.29 to 4.35 for the Charlson Index. STEMI was the 
only condition that presented slightly larger regional differences in the comorbidity 





6.41 in Takoma Park. For the Charlson Index means, Baltimore was 7.06, Salisbury was 
5.39, and Takoma Park was 5.76.  
In terms of hospital characteristics, Baltimore contains the highest average bed 
size, Salisbury and Takoma Park had lower, and similar, bed size averages. However, the 
majority of hospitals in Baltimore and Takoma Park e teaching hospitals and belong to 
hospital systems, with means of ~0.91 for Baltimore and ~0.8 for Takoma Park, whereas 
none of the hospitals in Salisbury fit this criteria so the means are 0.  
In summary, Baltimore is the largest HRR of the three. It has a higher number of 
observations for all conditions; the most noticeabl difference is in trauma, for which 
Baltimore has 22,446 observations and Salisbury has 1,527. For all the conditions, 
Takoma Park has the second most number of observations, leaving Salisbury with the 
fewest.  
4.4 Two-Sample T-Tests 
Two-sample t-tests were used to assess regional vari tion in demographics and 
hospital characteristics. Tables 4.7 – 4.11 outline he significant differences, if any, for 
the covariates by condition among two HRRs at a time. The use of a two-sample t-test 
models the differences between the Baltimore and Salisbury HRRs, Baltimore and 
Takoma Park, and Salisbury and Takoma Park for sepsis, trauma, acute ischemic stroke, 










Condition = Sepsis 
Baltimore, 
Salisbury  
(N = 20,032)  
Baltimore, Takoma 
Park  
(N = 24,852) 
Salisbury, Takoma 
Park  
(N = 7,695) 
t p t p t p 
Died during hospitalization -0.47 0.636 0.4 0.692 -0.47 0.636 
Age -8 <.0001 -2 0.041 -8 <.0001 
Female -1.17 0.242 -4.64 <.0001 1.82 0.0695 
Admission day is a weekend -1.17 0.242 -0.46 0.642 -1.17 0.242 
Sepsis . . . . . . 
Trauma -2.98 <.0001 1.25 0.212 -2.98 0.002 
Stroke -1.19 <.0001 0.09 0.929 -1.19 0.232 
Cardiac Arrest -1.39 0.163 0.34 0.736 -1.39 0.163 
STEMI 0.91 0.36 -0.05 0.95 0.91 0.364 
Bed Size 25 <.0001 34 <.0001 25 <.0001 
Competition Index for all inpatient -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Competition Index for inpatient from ED -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Competition Index for Sepsis -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Elixhauser index -1.96 0.049 10.21 <.0001 -1.96 0.049 
Charlson Index 0.42 0.677 10.4 <.0001 0.42 0.677 
White -11.57 <.0001 37.22 <.0001 -11.57 <.0001 
Black 11.02 <.0001 -19.91 <.0001 11.02 <.0001 
Hispanic -1.04 0.299 -20.74 <.0001 -1.04 0.299 
Asian 7.84 <.0001 -9.31 <.0001 7.84 <.0001 
Native American 1.35 0.176 -4.23 <.0001 1.35 0.176 
Other 1.62 0.105 -5.46 <.0001 1.62 0.105 
Medicare -6.93 <.0001 1.99 0.046 -6.93 <.0001 
Medicaid 11.76 <.0001 4.91 <.0001 11.76 <.0001 
Private -0.81 0.01 -7.15 <.0001 -0.8 0.425 
Other 3.88 0.0001 3.52 0.004 3.88 0.0001 
Urban 32.67 <.0001 -15.23 <.0001 32.67 <.0001 
Income percentile 0-25 2.81 0.005 43 <.0001 2.81 0.005 
Income percentile 26-50 -28.09 <.0001 40.94 <.0001 -28.09 <.0001 
Income percentile 51-75 -1.53 0.126 -9.63 <.0001 -1.5 0.134 
Income percentile 76-100 61.06 <.0001 -30.7 <.0001 61.06 <.0001 
Hospital System 409.83 <.0001 11.42 <.0001 310.12 <.0001 
Teaching hospital 310.12 <.0001 16.79 <.0001 409.83 <.0001 






Condition = Trauma 
Baltimore, 
Salisbury  
(N = 23,973)  
Baltimore, Takoma 
Park  
(N = 26,689) 
Salisbury, Takoma 
Park  
(N = 5,770) 
t p t p t p 
Died during hospitalization 1.7 0.089 1.5 0.132 -0.6 0.545 
Age -15 <.0001 -9 <.0001 8 <.0001 
Female -6.06 <.0001 -4.04 <.0001 3.1 0.001 
Admission day is a weekend 1.68 0.092 0.66 0.508 -1.1 0.269 
Sepsis -3.88 0.0001 -6.63 <.0001 -0.25 0.803 
Trauma . . . . . . 
Stroke -4.55 <.0001 1.51 0.131 4.92 <.0001 
Cardiac Arrest -1.55 <.0001 1.03 0.301 1.91 0.056 
STEMI -1.12 0.262 0.37 0.714 1.21 0.227 
Bed Size 56 <.0001 96 <.0001 2 0.033 
Competition Index for all inpatient -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Competition Index for inpatient from ED -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Competition Index for Trauma -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Elixhauser index -6.74 <.0001 0.49 0.621 6.5 <.0001 
Charlson Index -5.86 <.0001 0.48 0.631 5.67 <.0001 
White -16.88 <.0001 23.51 <.0001 29.73 <.0001 
Black 18.45 <.0001 -15.17 <.0001 -25.51 <.0001 
Hispanic -1.18 0.236 -12.62 <.0001 -8.02 <.0001 
Asian 5.14 <.0001 -5.71 <.0001 -7.93 <.0001 
Native American 2.16 0.031 -1.15 0.251 -2.41 0.016 
Other 1.32 0.186 -1.17 0.242 -1.86 0.06 
Medicare -11.7 <.0001 -3.91 <.0001 8.02 <.0001 
Medicaid 15.39 <.0001 4.43 <.0001 -9.42 <.0001 
Private 1.67 0.095 -3.06 0.002 -3.22 0.001 
Other 6.83 <.0001 12.42 <.0001 0.87 0.383 
Urban 32.85 <.0001 -13.72 <.0001 -35.25 <.0001 
Income percentile 0-25 0.97 0.331 35.32 <.0001 12.91 <.0001 
Income percentile 26-50 -23.72 <.0001 38.22 <.0001 33.35 <.0001 
Income percentile 51-75 -3.25 0.001 -7.53 <.0001 -1.37 0.171 
Income percentile 76-100 44.68 <.0001 -25.3 <.0001 -53.86 <.0001 
Hospital System 543.32 <.0001 6.64 <.0001 -191.48 <.0001 
Teaching hospital 495.66 <.0001 10.26 <.0001 -160.18 <.0001 





Condition = Stroke 
Baltimore, 
Salisbury  
(N = 5,770)  
Baltimore, Takoma 
Park  
(N = 10,267) 
Salisbury, Takoma 
Park  
(N = 2,659) 
t p t p t p 
Died during hospitalization 1.3 0.213 -0.27 0.787 -1.2 0.229 
Age -3 0.001 -1 0.141 2 0.111 
Female 1.29 0.908 -2.92 0.003 -3.02 0.002 
Admission day is a weekend -0.05 0.956 -1.16 0.245 -0.71 0.476 
Sepsis 1.27 0.202 -5.22 <.0001 -4.93 <.0001 
Trauma -1.26 0.207 2.09 0.037 2.37 <.0001 
Stroke . . . <.0001 . <.0001 
Cardiac Arrest 0.03 0.98 -1.73 0.083 -1.29 0.198 
STEMI -1.07 0.284 0.1 0.923 1 0.317 
Bed Size 18 <.0001 26 <.0001 2 0 
Competition Index for all inpatient -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Competition Index for inpatient from ED -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Competition Index for Stroke -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Elixhauser index 1.29 0.196 3.04 0.002 0.92 0 
Charlson Index 0.88 0.378 2.722.72 0.006 1.06 0.288 
White -10.47 <.0001 20.36 <.0001 23.14 <.0001 
Black 10.24 <.0001 -13.77 <.0001 -18.29 <.0001 
Hispanic -0.14 0.892 -6.59 <.0001 -5.25 <.0001 
Asian 4.87 <.0001 -6.38 <.0001 -7.8 <.0001 
Native American 0.32 0.747 -0.33 0.783 -0.5 0.618 
Other 1.28 0.201 -2.77 0.005 -3.13 0.001 
Medicare -4.41 <.0001 1.3 0.194 4.51 <.0001 
Medicaid 7.53 <.0001 0.69 0.492 -5.12 <.0001 
Private 0.42 0.676 -2.97 0.003 -2.37 0.017 
Other 1.67 0.09 5.4 <.0001 1.55 0.121 
Urban 25.9 <.0001 -17.61 <.0001 -29.04 <.0001 
Income percentile 0-25 -0.91 0.365 27.68 <.0001 12.18 <.0001 
Income percentile 26-50 -20.2 <.0001 20.59 <.0001 27.07 <.0001 
Income percentile 51-75 -1.27 0.203 -5.36 <.0001 -2.51 0.012 
Income percentile 76-100 43.5 <.0001 -14.58 <.0001 -41 <.0001 
Hospital System 306.32 <.0001 9.51 <.0001 -89.11 <.0001 
Teaching hospital 256.11 <.0001 12.49 <.0001 -70.52 <.0001 




 Table 4.10. Two Sample T-Test for Cardiac Arrest
Condition = Cardiac Arrest 
Baltimore, 
Salisbury  
(N = 1,780)  
Baltimore, Takoma 
Park  
(N = 1,959) 
Salisbury, Takoma 
Park  
(N = 511) 
t p t p t p 
Died during hospitalization 1.46 0.144 0.59 0.556 -0.91 0.362 
Age 0 0.69 -4 <.0001 -2 0.013 
Female 0.76 0.445 -0.59 0.554 -1.03 0.303 
Admission day is a weekend -1.37 0.172 -0.1 0.917 1.1 0.273 
Sepsis 0.5 0.614 -6.04 <.0001 -4.09 <.0001 
Trauma 0.02 0.98 1.91 0.056 1.1 0.272 
Stroke -0.21 0.832 -1.53 0.126 -0.86 0.389 
Cardiac Arrest . . . . . . 
STEMI -2.23 0.027 0.22 0.823 2.14 0.033 
Bed Size 10 <.0001 14 <.0001 2 0.047 
Competition Index for all inpatient -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Competition Index for inpatient from ED -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Competition Index for Cardiac Arrest -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Elixhauser index -1.31 0.19 -0.01 0.994 1.18 0.237 
Charlson Index -0.61 0.542 -0.9 0.371 -0.03 0.976 
White -3.25 0.001 10.85 <.0001 9.92 <.0001 
Black 3.43 0.001 -6.75 <.0001 -7.44 <.0001 
Hispanic -1 0.316 -4.09 <.0001 -2.59 0.01 
Asian 0.32 0.752 -2.64 0.001 -2.49 0.01 
Native American 1.41 0.157 -1.09 0.276 -1.42 0.157 
Other 0.15 0.876 -0.68 0.499 -0.6 0.552 
Medicare -1.33 0.184 -1.73 0.083 -0.07 0.942 
Medicaid 5.25 <.0001 3.58 .0004 -1.71 0.088 
Private -1.6 0.109 -1.31 0.191 0.53 0.594 
Other -0.41 0.68 4.72 <.0001 1.74 0.083 
Urban 11.35 <.0001 -3.64 .0003 -11.88 <.0001 
Income percentile 0-25 2.83 0.005 13.82 <.0001 3.95 <.0001 
Income percentile 26-50 -8.26 <.0001 10.55 <.0001 11.59 <.0001 
Income percentile 51-75 -1.12 0.264 -4.85 <.0001 -2.14 0.033 
Income percentile 76-100 12.57 <.0001 -6.96 <.0001 -11.65 <.0001 
Hospital System 134.57 <.0001 2.76 <.0001 -46.7 <.0001 









Condition = STEMI 
Baltimore, 
Salisbury  
(N =  2,420)  
Baltimore, Takoma 
Park  
(N =  2,570) 
Salisbury, Takoma 
Park  
(N = 644) 
t p t p t p 
Died during hospitalization -0.47 0.635 -1.66 0.098 -0.76 0.447 
Age 0 0.905 0 0.843 0 0.971 
Female 0.85 0.394 1.12 0.264 0.04 0.964 
Admission day is a weekend -1.08 0.28 -0.3 0.766 0.68 0.494 
Sepsis 2.67 0.008 -3.58 .0004 -4.76 <.0001 
Trauma 0.1 0.919 0.24 0.811 0.08 0.938 
Stroke -1.06 0.292 -0.22 0.829 0.77 0.439 
Cardiac Arrest -1.82 0.07 -0.62 0.535 1.19 0.235 
STEMI . . . . . . 
Bed Size 5 <.0001 8 <.0001 4 <.0001 
Competition Index for all inpatient -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Competition Index for inpatient from ED -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Competition Index for STEMI -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 -Infty <.0001 
Elixhauser index 3.27 0.001 2.4 0.016 -0.92 0.358 
Charlson Index 3.62 .0003 3.16 0.001 -0.66 0.51 
White -2.59 0.009 11.93 <.0001 10.57 <.0001 
Black 4.09 <.0001 -7.13 <.0001 -8.58 <.0001 
Hispanic -1.34 0.182 -5.25 <.0001 -3.48 .0005 
Asian 1.33 0.185 -3.45 .0006 -3.82 <.0001 
Native American 2.65 0.008 -1.9 0.057 -2.47 0.014 
Other -1.35 0.719 2.17 0.03 2.25 0.025 
Medicare -0.36 0.719 0.47 0.64 0.61 0.541 
Medicaid 3.63 .0003 1.49 0.135 -1.66 0.097 
Private -1.61 0.107 -1.93 0.054 0.01 0.99 
Other 1.15 0.252 2.66 0.008 0.65 0.519 
Urban 15.49 <.0001 -7.61 <.0001 -16.95 <.0001 
Income percentile 0-25 -1.65 0.101 10.82 <.0001 6.09 <.0001 
Income percentile 26-50 -8.7 <.0001 11.93 <.0001 12.54 <.0001 
Income percentile 51-75 -0.97 0.333 -1.02 0.307 0.12 0.906 
Income percentile 76-100 17.08 <.0001 -7.83 <.0001 -18.93 <.0001 
Hospital System 154.15 <.0001 -1.13 0.261 -73.67 <.0001 




 The t-tests showed no significant differences for condition-specific mortality 
among the HRRs. There are significant demographic differences among the HRRs for all 
the conditions, especially for race, payer, and income quartile, indicating the need to 
control for these variables in the multivariable regression analyses.  
Approximations of underlying patient severity, as as essed by the Elixhauser and 
Charlson Comorbidity Indices, were not significantly different among the HRRs, except 
for the trauma condition between Salisbury and Takoma Park. The t-test results also 
allow relative and conditional comparisons of one condition by another. 
Hospital characteristics are significantly different in the all of the HRR and 
condition comparisons. The variables bed size, teaching status and hospital system 
affiliation vary among the HRRs, framing the premise for this study’s examination of 
hospital competition and outcomes.  
4.5 Competition and Mortality Regressions 
4.51 Initial Analysis of Binary Competition Variable and Mortality  
The Chi-Square test and multivariable binary logistic regression for the binary 
competition variable, comparing the Salisbury HRR to the Baltimore and Takoma Park 
HRRs, and condition-associated mortality were not significant, implying that the next 
logical step would be to control for confounders. In Table 4.12, the Chi-Square Test 
results are outlined for the different conditions. None of the conditions showed a 














Table 4.12. Chi-Square Test for HRR by Mortality.  
 
For the basic logistic regression, the main independent variable was the binary 
competition variable that compared the Salisbury HRR’s low level of competition, as the 
treatment group, to the Baltimore and Takoma Park HRRs’ high levels of competition, as 
the reference group. This allowed for a regional comparison of varied levels of 
competition. The basic logistic regressions, withou any controls, results for the different 
conditions are modeled in Table 4.14 through odds ratio point estimates with a 95% 
confidence interval and two-tailed statistical significance level, α, at 0.05. For the sepsis 
basic model, the odds ratio point estimate is 0.957 and for STEMI, the odds ratio point 
estimate is 0.952. Because these odds ratio estimates are below one, it indicates that there 
is a lower odds of sepsis and STEMI mortality in Salisbury compared to Baltimore and 
Takoma Park. However, the p-value for these regression  were >0.05, the relationship is 
therefore not significant.   
In contrast to this, the other conditions have point estimates higher than one, 
suggesting that the odds of mortality for trauma, acute ischemic stroke, and cardiac arrest 
are all higher in Salisbury than Baltimore and Takoma Park. However, the p-values for 
these conditions’ basic regression models are all >0.05 as well, indicating insignificant 
Condition 0 p 
Sepsis 0.438 0.803 
Trauma 4.013 0.134 
Stroke 1.5 0.473 
Cardiac Arrest 2.396 0.301 





associations. The high p-values indicate that none of the basic, binary logistic 










Note.  *p<.05**p< 0.01.  All models include low competition binary variable.  
Basic – only low competition binary  
Demographics includes: age, age squared, gender binary, racial binary        
Comorbidity includes: Elixhauser Comorbidity, Charlson Comorbidity Index 
Demographics+ includes: demographics, payer binary, urban, income quartile binary  
Demographics+, Comorbidity includes: demographics+, omorbidity 
Facility includes: bed size, teaching status 
Facility+ includes: hospital fixed effects 
Demographics+, Comorbidity, Facility includes: demographics+, comorbidity, facility  
Table 4.13. Results of Stepwise Regression Examining Effects of Competition on 
Sepsis Mortality, with Instrumental Variables Analysis for Hospital Competition. 











Model OR 95% CI df p 
Basic 0.957 0.815, 1.123 2 0.631 
Demographics 1.018 0.865, 1.198 10 0.727 
Comorbidity 0.929 0.791, 1.091 4 0.414 
Demographics+ 1.311** 1.081, 1.591 18 0.006 
Demographics+, Comorbidity 1.251* 1.031, 1.519 20 0.024 
Facility 0.745** 0.619, 0.897 4 0.001 
Facility+ 0.911 0.636, 1.303   0.609 





Model Sepsis Trauma Stroke Cardiac Arrest STEMI 
Basic 0.957 1.284 1.241 1.264 0.952 
Demographics 1.011 1.425* 1.281 1.221 0.922 
Comorbidity 0.929 1.273 1.24 1.214 0.953 
Demographics+ 1.311** 1.581* 1.603* 1.308 1.074 
Demographics+, Comorbidity 1.242** 1.535* 1.609* 1.227 1.108 
Facility 0.737** 0.861 0.84 1.568* 1.424 
Facility+ 0.911 0.834 1.172 2.051 0.321 
Demographics+, Comorbidity, Facility 0.974 0.985 1.073 1.578 1.85* 
Note.  *p<.05 **p< 0.01. All models include low competition binary variable.  
Basic – only low competition binary  
Demographics includes: age, age squared, gender binary, racial binary        
Comorbidity includes: Elixhauser Comorbidity, Charlson Comorbidity Index 
Demographics+ includes: demographics, payer binary, urban, income quartile binary  
Demographics+, Comorbidity includes: demographics+, omorbidity 
Facility includes: bed size, teaching status 
Facility+ includes: hospital fixed effects 
Demographics+, Comorbidity, Facility includes: demographics+, comorbidity, facility  
Table 4.14 Results of Stepwise Regression Examining Effects of Competition on 





The stepwise regressions showed significant results for the demographics+ and 
demographics+, comorbidity model for sepsis, trauma, and stroke. Also, the significant 
results for the sepsis and cardiac arrest facility model suggest that the association of 
between hospital competition and mortality may vary by facility-level characteristics.  
The odds of sepsis mortality were higher in a low cmpetition region than the 
high competition regions for the demographics+ (1.31 , p = 0.006) and demographics+, 
comorbidity models (1.251, p = 0.024). The sepsis facility model showed the opposite 
result (0.737, p = 0.001); the odds of sepsis mortality in a low competition region are 
lower than high competition regions. This is the only regression that suggests that the 
likelihood of mortality is lower in a low-competition region.  
Similar to the sepsis demographics+ model, the trauma (1.581, p = 0.021) and 
acute ischemic stroke (1.585, p = 0.029) conditions show an association of higher 
mortality in the low competition region than high competition regions. Likewise, the 
demographics+, comorbidity model for sepsis (1.251, p = 0.024), trauma (1.535, p = 
0.031) and acute ischemic stroke (1.591, p = 0.028) showed significantly likelihood of 
mortality in the low competition region. These results indicate that a HRR with lower 
levels of competition have a higher likelihood of mortality for these conditions, compared 
to regions with high levels of competition.  
While the sepsis facility model suggests that there are lower odds of mortality in 
the low competition region, the cardiac arrest facility model (1.578, p = 0.024) shows 
otherwise and reiterates the other models’ significant results. Besides the sepsis facility 
model, the other significant multivariable regression  suggest that a region with lower 





For the demographics+ and demographics+, comorbidity models, sepsis, trauma, 
and acute ischemic stroke all had significant results, with point estimates higher than one. 
Specifically, the point estimates for sepsis was 1.30  and 1.242. For trauma, the estimates 
were 1.59 and 1.537 for the two models. The trauma demographics model was also 
significant, with a point estimate of 1.425. For acute ischemic stroke, the point estimates 
for the demographics+ and demographics+, comorbidity models were 1.603 and 1.609. 
These odds ratio point estimates indicate that the odds of mortality are higher in a low 
competition HRR than a high competition HRR. While only some of the results indicated 
significant associations, the initial results from the multivariable binary logistic 
regressions suggest that higher competition may result in better outcomes, when 
controlling for confounding factors.  
The final stepwise regression model included all demographics, comorbidity, and 
hospital characteristics as covariates, with the binary competition variable as the main 
independent variable and mortality as the dependent variable. There is a significantly 
higher likelihood of STEMI mortality (1.894, p = 0.007) in the low competition region 
than high competition region. Mortality did not vary significantly for sepsis, trauma, 
acute ischemic stroke, and cardiac arrest (p >0.05) when considering all patient- and 
hospital-level covariates.  
4.6 Two Stage Least Squares Estimation 
The 2SLS estimation was conducted for all of the conditions of interest, but only 
sepsis and trauma showed significant associations. These conditions had significant, and 
reversed, results upon initially adding the hospital system affiliation covariate in the 
multivariable logistic regression. The OLS and 2SLS results for sepsis are highlighted in 





extremely high value, already indicating that the two estimates may not be comparable. A 
large F-statistic indicates that OLS is inconsistent, a d that the variable may be 
endogenous. The intercept parameter was 0.336 with a t-value of 115.37, significant with 
a p-value of <.0001. The system binary parameter was -0.336, with a t-value of -105.56, 
significant with a p-value of <.0001. For the 2SLS, the F-value was 23.75, which is still 
higher than the proposed 10 to indicate the use of instrumental variable analysis. The 
intercept parameter estimate was 0.125, with a t-value of 57, and significant with a p-
value of <.0001. For the competition binary variable, the parameter estimate was -0.079, 
with a t-value of -4.87, and significant with a p-value of <.0001. The differences in 
parameter estimates indicates that the two estimation models produce different results, 
indicating the need to test exogeneity.  
4.6.1 Hausman Test of Endogeneity 







For sepsis, the Hausman Test Statistic was 92.16 and for trauma, the Hausman 
Test Statistic was 105.06. These are extraordinarily high values, leading to rejection of 
the null hypothesis that there is no difference betwe n the two variables. This indicates 
that competition is endogenous, supporting the use of the instrumental variable analysis, 
treating competition as endogenous.  
4.7 Binary Logistic Regressions with Instrumental Variable Method 
The results of the binary logistic regressions with instrumental variable analysis 





analysis for hospital system affiliation switched the odds ratio estimate, where higher 
hospital system competition in the HRR is associated with increased odds of mortality for 
sepsis and trauma.  
 
Model OR 95% CI df p 
Basic 0.65** 0.53, 0.797 2 <.0001 
Demographics 0.683** 0.556, 0.84 10 .0003 
Comorbidity 0.624** 0.509, 0.766 4 <.0001 
Demographics+ 0.902 0.713, 1.142 18 0.392 
Demographics+, Comorbidity 0.855 0.675, 1.083 20 0.194 
Facility 0.615** 0.499, 0.758 4 <.0001 
Demographics+, Comorbidity, Facility 0.811 0.636, 1.035 22 0.092 
Demographics+, Comorbidity, Facility† 0.745** 0.6, 0.926 20 0.007 
Note.  *p<.05 **p< 0.01. All models include low competition binary variable.  
Basic – only low competition binary  
Demographics includes: age, age squared, gender binary, racial binary        
Comorbidity includes: Elixhauser Comorbidity, Charlson Comorbidity Index 
Demographics+ includes: demographics, payer binary, urban, income quartile binary  
Demographics+, Comorbidity includes: demographics+, omorbidity 
Facility includes: bed size, teaching status 
Facility+ includes: hospital fixed effects 
Demographics+, Comorbidity, Facility includes: demographics+, comorbidity, facility  
Table 4.15. Results of Stepwise Regression Examining Effects of Competition on 




Sepsis OR OR§ 
Basic 0.957 0.65** 
Demographics 1.018 0.683** 
Comorbidity 0.929 0.624** 
Demographics+ 1.311** 0.902 
Demographics+, Comorbidity 1.251* 0.855 
Facility 0.745** 0.615** 
Facility+ 0.911 0.811 
Demographics+, Comorbidity, Facility 0.982 0.745** 
Note. § - with hospital system binary var., *p<.05, **p<.01 
Basic – only low competition binary  
Demographics includes: age, age squared, gender binary, racial binary        
Comorbidity includes: Elixhauser Comorbidity, Charlson Comorbidity Index 
Demographics+ includes: demographics, payer binary, urban, income quartile binary  
Demographics+, Comorbidity includes: demographics+, omorbidity 
Facility includes: bed size, teaching status 
Facility+ includes: hospital fixed effects 
Demographics+, Comorbidity, Facility includes: demographics+, comorbidity, facility 
Table 4.16. Results of Stepwise Regression Examining Effects of Competition on 
Sepsis Mortality, with Instrumental Variables Analysis for Hospital System 




Trauma OR OR§ 
Basic 1.284 0.566* 
Demographics 1.425* 0.533* 
Comorbidity 1.273 0.566* 
Demographics+ 1.59* 0.593 
Demographics+, Comorbidity 1.537* 0.588 
Facility 0.861 0.539* 
Facility+ 0.834 0.834 
Demographics+, Comorbidity, Facility 0.985 0.549* 
Note. § - with hospital system binary var., *p<.05, **p<.01 
Basic – only low competition binary  
Demographics includes: age, age squared, gender binary, racial binary        
Comorbidity includes: Elixhauser Comorbidity, Charlson Comorbidity Index 
Demographics+ includes: demographics, payer binary, urban, income quartile binary  
Demographics+, Comorbidity includes: demographics+, omorbidity 
Facility includes: bed size, teaching status 
Facility+ includes: hospital fixed effects 
Demographics+, Comorbidity, Facility includes: demographics+, comorbidity, facility 
Table 4.17. Results of Stepwise Regression Examining Effects of Competition on 






Stroke OR OR§ 
Basic 1.241 0.632 
Demographics 1.281 0.618 
Comorbidity 1.24 0.628 
Demographics+ 1.603* 0.754 
Demographics+† 1.609* 0.754 
Demographics+, Comorbidity 0.84 0.572 
Facility 1.172 1.172 
Facility+ 1.073 0.668 
Note. § - with hospital system binary var., *p<.05, **p<.01 
Basic – only low competition binary  
Demographics includes: age, age squared, gender binary, racial binary        
Comorbidity includes: Elixhauser Comorbidity, Charlson Comorbidity Index 
Demographics+ includes: demographics, payer binary, urban, income quartile binary  
Demographics+, Comorbidity includes: demographics+, omorbidity 
Facility includes: bed size, teaching status 
Facility+ includes: hospital fixed effects 
Demographics+, Comorbidity, Facility includes: demographics+, comorbidity, facility 
Table 4.18. Results of Stepwise Regression Examining Effects of Competition on 







Cardiac Arrest OR OR§ 
Basic 1.264 1.376 
Demographics 1.221 1.301 
Comorbidity 1.214 1.359 
Demographics+ 1.308 1.473 
Demographics+† 1.227 1.434 
Demographics+, Comorbidity 1.568* 1.57 
Facility 2.051 2.051 
Facility+ 1.578 1.618 
Note. § - with hospital system binary var., *p<.05, **p<.01 
Basic – only low competition binary  
Demographics includes: age, age squared, gender binary, racial binary        
Comorbidity includes: Elixhauser Comorbidity, Charlson Comorbidity Index 
Demographics+ includes: demographics, payer binary, urban, income quartile binary  
Demographics+, Comorbidity includes: demographics+, omorbidity 
Facility includes: bed size, teaching status 
Facility+ includes: hospital fixed effects 
Demographics+, Comorbidity, Facility includes: demographics+, comorbidity, facility 
Table 4.19. Results of Stepwise Regression Examining Effects of Competition on 







STEMI OR OR§ 
Basic 0.952 0.831 
Demographics 0.922 0.754 
Comorbidity 0.953 0.826 
Demographics+ 1.074 0.902 
Demographics+† 1.108 0.921 
Demographics+, Comorbidity 1.424 1.004 
Facility 0.321 0.321 
Facility+ 1.85* 1.262 
Note. § - with hospital system binary var., *p<.05, **p<.01 
Basic – only low competition binary  
Demographics includes: age, age squared, gender binary, racial binary        
Comorbidity includes: Elixhauser Comorbidity, Charlson Comorbidity Index 
Demographics+ includes: demographics, payer binary, urban, income quartile binary  
Demographics+, Comorbidity includes: demographics+, omorbidity 
Facility includes: bed size, teaching status 
Facility+ includes: hospital fixed effects 
Demographics+, Comorbidity, Facility includes: demographics+, comorbidity, facility 
Table 4.20. Results of Stepwise Regression Examining Effects of Competition on 






p OR 95% CI p OR 95% CI 
0.0003 0.776 0.676, 0.890 0.0002 0.523 0.373, 0.733 
 
Table 4.21. Results of Binary Logistic Regression Examining Effects of Competition 
on Sepsis and Trauma Mortality, with Instrumental Variables Analysis for Hospital 
System Affiliation, exclusion of Competition Binary Variable.   
Note. Uses Demographics+, Comorbidity, Facility Model includes: age, age squared, 
gender binary, racial binary, payer binary, urban, i come quartile binary, Elixhauser 
Comorbidity, Charlson Comorbidity Index, bed size, teaching status, and hospital system 




Sepsis One-Stage Least Square 
 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error t p 
Intercept 0.0994 0.004 19.86 <.0001 
System 0.0266 0.005 -105.56 <.0001 
Note. F-statistic = 11,143.6 
 
Sepsis Two-Stage Least Square 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error t p 
Intercept 0.125 0.002 57 <.0001 
System -0.079 0.016 -4.87 <.0001 
Note. F-statistic = 23.75 
Hausman Test Statistic = 92.16 for sepsis  








Trauma One-Stage Least Square 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error t p 
Intercept 0.016  0.002 5.98 <.0001 
System 0.012 0.002 4.28 <.0001 
Note. F-statistic = 18.31 
 
Trauma Two-Stage Least Square 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error t p 
Intercept 0.028 0.001 27.79 <.0001 
System -0.029 0.006 -4.28 <.0001 
Note. F-statistic = 105.06 
Hausman Test Statistic = 105.06 for trauma 






The instrumental variables analysis reversed the original stepwise regression 
estimates, and became significant, for sepsis and tr uma in the basic, demographics, 
comorbidity, facility, ‘demographics+, comorbidity, and facility’ models. The estimate 
for the original sepsis facility model (0.737, p = 0.001) was the only regression that 
showed a lower odds of mortality in a low competition region. The same model, with 
inclusion of the instrumental variable, amplifies this association with an even lower point 
estimate of 0.615 (p <.0001).  
For sepsis, the ‘demographics+, comorbidity, facility’ model with all covariates 
became significant as well (0.745, p = 0.007), showing a significantly lower odds of 
sepsis mortality in a low competition region, compared to a high competition region 
when controlling for all patient- and hospital-covariates.  The average estimates for sepsis 
in the basic, demographics, comorbidity, and demographics+ model was 0.643 (p 
<.0001). The odds of mortality is on average, 35 percent less in a low competition region 
compared to a region with high competition.  
For trauma, the inclusion of instrumental variable analysis showed significant, 
and reversed, estimates for the same significant models as sepsis. The original estimate 
for the basic model switched from 1.284 to 0.566 (p = 0.033). This switch in estimate 
direction also occurs for the demographics (0.533, p = 0.019) and comorbidity model 
(0.566, p = 0.033) – justifying the need for instrumental variable analysis to produce 
more consistent and accurate parameter estimates. Th  estimates for the facility and 
‘demographics+, comorbidity, facility’ models became significant with instrumental 
variables analysis, with estimates of 0.539 (p = 0.027) and 0.549 (p = 0.047), 





trauma mortality is almost half as less likely in a low competition region than a high 
competition region.  
The demographics+ and demographics+, comorbidity models for sepsis and 
trauma became insignificant with the instrumental variables analysis. Inpatient mortality 
for acute ischemic stroke, cardiac arrest, and STEMI showed no significant changes after 
inclusion of the instrumental variable.  
 Upon removing the competition variable from the demographics+, comorbidity 
and facility model, the sepsis and trauma models were significant below <.01. In a low 
competition region, sepsis mortality is 32 percent lower (0.776, p = 0.0003) than a high 
competition region. The trauma condition heightens thi  protective effect of a low 
competition region – mortality in a low competition region is 0.53 less likely than a high 
competition region. In essence, the odds of trauma mortality is nearly cut in half in a low 
competition region.   
4.8 Conclusion 
While initial results suggest that an HRR with high levels of hospital competition 
improves outcomes for emergency conditions, these stepwise regressions did not consider 
the potential endogeneity of competition, possibly skewing the results. The stepwise 
regressions results without the instrumental variable method support previous studies’ 
findings of competition improving outcomes. For sepis, trauma, acute ischemic stroke, 
cardiac arrest, and STEMI, the odds of mortality were greater in a low competition region 
compared to a high competition region. This suggests that competition can improve 
quality, delivery of care, and thus, patient outcomes.  
In the 2SLS estimations, competition was considered ndogenous and the 





estimates for sepsis and trauma suggest that the odds of mortality are lower in a region 
with low competition compared to a region with high competition.  
The use of instrumental variable analysis was validate  through the 2SLS 
estimation, yielding significantly different estimates from the OLS and the IV, and the 
Hausman Test for endogeneity. The instrumental variable results suggest that hospital 
system affiliation is highly correlated with competition, and potentially improved 
outcomes but only through the competition. Upon treating competition as an endogenous 
variable, the subsequent multivariable regressions reveal a positive relationship between 
competition and mortality for sepsis (0.776, p = 0.00 3) and trauma (0.523, p = 0.0002).  
5: Discussion 
This study’s findings suggest variability in inpatient hospital mortality for 
emergency care conditions and contrasting levels of regional competition. This study 
estimated the relationship between competition and emergency outcomes, by accounting 
for the presence of hospital systems in a region. Initial results using stepwise regression 
models, accounting for common patient- and hospital-covariates, were comparable to the 
findings from previous studies examining competition and patient outcomes (Gaynor & 
Town, 2012; Kessler & McClellan, 2000; Miller, 1996; Bloom et al., 2010; Sari, 2002). 
The odds of mortality for emergency care conditions were higher in a low competition 
region. However, with consideration to the possibility of inconsistent parameter estimates 
due to a possible endogenous regressor, the regressions with instrumental variable 
analysis, show that a region with low competition ca  have a protective effect on 
mortality for these conditions – the odds of mortality for sepsis (0.776) and trauma (0.53) 





competition. The differences in parameter estimates from the original logistic regressions 
and the subsequent regressions using instrumental vari ble analysis suggest that there 
may be an association between system-affiliation, vlume, and thus impacting the level 
of competition.  
 These results suggest that lower levels of competition promotes better outcomes, 
refutes basic economic theory and previous findings that competition improves quality of 
care. While it is notoriously difficult to measure the effects of mergers (Gaynor, 2012), 
this study assesses variables related to hospital consolidation through the explanatory 
variable of varying regional competition levels and i strumental variable of hospital 
system affiliation. The instrumental variable analysis suggests that lower levels of 
competition are associated with better outcomes, as hown by decreased sepsis and 
trauma mortality. Additionally, these results underscore the need to discretely examine 
the outcomes of unplanned, critical illnesses.  
 The study developed a groundbreaking modified-HHI methodology and use of 
instrumental variable analysis to examine the impact of ompetition in unplanned, critical 
illness. Much of the quality and outcomes literature focuses chronic conditions and 
planned care at the individual hospital level, with little regard to care coordination 
factors. This study is the one of the first to provide estimates of the effect of competition 
on emergency care outcomes, linking instances of the delivery of high-quality emergency 
care problem in the context of health economics. The present findings offer support for 
the idea that competition may be aversive in instances of unplanned, critical illness – 
instead, coordinated hospital systems may be better suited to deliver timely, high-quality 





 The study’s methodology and ability to exploit Maryl nd’s natural experiment of 
regulated payments allows a unique study of competition and emergency care outcomes. 
SID is a large, state database used to estimate the effect of competition on mortality for 
emergency care conditions based on real-world data.The database is contained within the 
state of Maryland, which utilizes an all-payer model, naturally controlling for price. In 
essence, it allowed for a study of regional competition, attenuating the effect of price. 
Previous studies that attempted to study the effects of competition on patient outcomes 
are unable to differentiate between the impact of price and the number of providers on 
patient outcomes. Maryland’s All-Payer Model is theonly state in the nation that can 
provide an environment to purely measure competition, as the number of providers in the 
local healthcare market, on patient outcomes.  
Most hospital consolidation opponents suggest that hospital consolidation 
increases insurance clout, and therefore price. On the other hand, those in favor of 
hospital consolidation cite improvements in quality and patient outcomes. This study 
provided a context to study these claims. Because ho pitals cannot compete on price, the 
state of Maryland has created a level-paying field, a lowing for studies of regulated 
payments and volume-based competition. As more stats consider adopting a fixed-
payment approach, or even capitation, this study’s results can provide insight on the 
effects of a uniform payment system on emergency care outcomes.   
Second, econometric methods of instrumental variables analysis were used to 
enable inference regarding the impact of a low competition HRR on mortality for 





affiliation and quality. Despite the use of the Hasuman and 2-Stage Least Squares 
Estimations, further tests need to be conducted to validate this instrumental variable.   
 The study has certain limitations. The Dartmouth Alas uses old data and arbitrary 
rules to determine boundaries for HRRs; these may not be reflective of actual health 
utilization patterns in the state. It is based on neurosurgical and cardiovascular surgery 
patterns, whereas this study is focused on unplanned, critical illnesses. The Dartmouth 
HRR guidelines can cross state lines. Therefore, the two other hospitals located in 
Delaware for the Salisbury HRR were not examined. Additionally, the state of Maryland 
is comprised of only three HRRs, signifying the more appropriate methodology of 
considering the competition index as binary, rather an continuous. For future studies 
that encompass more regions, the index could be considered continuous or use its log, to 
provide further insight of the effect of regional competition on emergency care outcomes.  
 The use of Maryland SID data has limitations as well. This study only examined 
Maryland hospitals, ignoring the neighboring effect of Virginia, Delaware and 
Washington, D.C. The Takoma Park HRR is located adjacent to the Washington, D.C. 
HRR, rendering the neighboring effect event more pronounced in the state and perhaps 
ignoring the outcomes of those patients that visit EDs in Washington, D.C. opposed to 
Takoma Park. Because Maryland is comprised of only three HRRs, limiting the 
competition measure methodology to be binary, opposed to continuous. A continuous 
HHI would be a more appropriate and valid measure of competition. Also, a study of 
more than three regions would allow for a more in-depth and comprehensive study of 





greater number of regions, the index could be considered continuous or use its log, to 
provide further insight of the effect of regional competition on emergency care outcomes.  
This study only examined one year of data, preventing any longitudinal 
conclusions. Coding variability is a concern with discharge abstracts and administrative 
data. ICD-9 coding may have inaccuracies, without laboratory results or patient health 
status assessments to unobservable patient severity bias. Without prior patient history or 
functional outcomes, the severity of the diagnosis is unknown. Furthermore, sepsis 
coding is highly variable, indicating that the ICD-9 codes used may not contain the true 
incidence of sepsis within the state. This study onl considered cases originating from the 
ED and excluded transfers. This may create bias in the results, because within-hospital 
transfers may alter outcomes. Health systems are molikely to transfer patients within 
the affiliated hospitals because of shared financial incentives. However, this study 
excludes this population because it only considered th  ED-admitted population, rather 
than those admitted via interfacility transfer.  
This state data did not consider geographical limitations. While the Salisbury 
HRR is largely isolated by the Chesapeake Bay, this study did not explicitly consider any 
other geographical barriers. Maryland’s topography includes a significant number of 
rivers and other waterways that may be creating georaphic variations. Additionally, 
rates of diversion were not examined in this study.  
Although this study considered instrumental variable analysis validity tests, more 
comprehensive tests could be performed with hospital-qu lity measures such as Hospital 
Compare data and other report cards. Intuitively, hospital system affiliation relates to 





that hospital system affiliation and mortality may not be exogenous. Additionally, the 
Hausman Test requires two exogenous variables but this study only considered hospital 
system. Future studies can include multiple exogenous relationship to validate 
competition as an endogenous variable, and its association with hospital system 
affiliation and mortality. Additionally, the study could consider hospital system affiliation 
as a covariate, rather than an instrumental variable. While the instrumental variable was 
created as a logical process and an attempt to understand the association between 
competition and emergency care outcomes, it is not necessarily restricted to only an 
instrumental variable approach. The use of hospital system affiliation as a covariate could 
provide a more accurate statistical analysis, withou  the need for the instrumental variable 
validation.   
Finally, this study only utilized inpatient onsite mortality measures as a quality 
indicators. To supplement the mortality variable, binary hospital variables were used to 
control for hospital-specific unobserved factors. However, the association between 
regional competition and mortality is nonlinear, indicating that the hospital-specific 
effects are not necessarily differenced away. Future studies may use additional health 
care quality measures, combining quantitative and qualitative data to provide better 
insight on this relationship.  
5.1 Future Directions 
 Future studies can use longitudinal and more comprehensive datasets to 
characterize the role of competition in a rate-regulated state. With the implementation of 
the new All-Payer model, that includes quality-payment initiatives and global budgets, 
these reforms follow the model of capitation. This as significant implications for 





longitudinal studies with future cohorts of Maryland SID data can seek causal inference 
between the global budget implementation and patient outcome.  
 Furthermore, the use of more comprehensive quality indicators for hospitals can 
provide better proxies for hospital quality. With the use of Hospital Compare data, future 
studies can use the structural and process measures that pertain to the ED to assess 
hospital quality. By identifying measures not relatd o competition, and controlling for 
these factors, the relationship between competition and hospital quality can be more 
definitive. Currently, the use of hospital controls may detract away from the real 
relationship of competition and quality. Additionally, in the state of Maryland, the range 
of quality may not be significantly different, prompting further studies in other states.  
 Additionally, condition-specific HHI calculations should be further investigated, 
especially for specialized sectors. Since emergency care is fundamentally different than 
planned care, the use of ED- and condition-specific HHIs revealed a more accurate 
assessment of the emergency care health market. The use of the modified-HHIs could be 
applied to claims data, to assess the relationship between reimbursement rates for 
different diseases and competition as well.  
 Ultimately, the Maryland-All Payer model is designed to control costs and 
improve quality through its new targets of reducing readmissions, hospital-acquired 
conditions, and improving population health measure (CMS, 2014). This state data could 
be compared with a similar state that does not use an All-Payer Model, to compare the 
effectiveness of the state’s reforms.  
5.2 Public Health Significance 
 The emergency care system is designed to optimize pati nt outcomes for day to 





emergencies. Inherently, a more coordinated system is inherently a more prepared 
system. Some suggest that coordination can take plac  through consolidated hospital 
systems, and the study’s findings and use of instrumental variable method for hospital 
system affiliation can attest to such claims. Emergency care provides unexpected care for 
individuals with acute care needs, and on a larger scale, provides care for catastrophes.  
 Despite the difficulty in ascertaining a state or region’s level of preparedness, 
using day-to-day outcomes can provide insight on the level of effectiveness and 
functionality of the emergency care system. Theoretically, if trauma mortality rates are 
relatively low for everyday occurrences, the emergency care system is more prepared and 
will be able to effectively respond in times of a mss shooting or a large-scale disaster.  
While the role of competition in emergency care has much to be discovered, an 
understanding of competition in a rate-regulated setting can provide insight on the 
relationship between competition and quality of care in the emergency care setting. 
Furthermore, an understanding of the role of competition in the emergency care sector 
can inform coordination initiatives among providers, to ultimately create an emergency 
care system that is patient-centered and integrated to provide high quality care and 







Classification of Hospitals and Hospital Systems by HRRs. 
 
Baltimore 
Hospital Health System 
Baltimore Washington Medical Center University of Maryland Medical System 
Bon Secours Baltimore Health System Bon Secours Health System, Inc.  
Carroll Hospital Center   
University of Maryland Shore Medical Center at Chestertown University of Maryland Medical System 
MedStar Franklin Square Hospital Center MedStar Health 
MedStar Good Samaritan Hospital MedStar Health 
Greater Baltimore Medical Center   
MedStar Harbor Hospital MedStar Health 
Harford Memorial Hospital Upper Chesapeake Health System 
Howard County General Hospital Johns Hopkins Health System 
Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center Johns Hopkins Health System 
Johns Hopkins Hospital Johns Hopkins Health System 
University of Maryland Rehabilitation and Orthopedic 
Institute University of Maryland Medical System 
University of Maryland Medical Center Midtown Campus University of Maryland Medical System 
University of Maryland Shore Medical Center at Easton University of Maryland Medical System 
Mercy Medical Center   
Northwest Hospital LifeBridge Health 
Saint Agnes Hospital Ascension Health 
Sinai Hospital of Baltimore LifeBridge Health 
St. Joseph Medical Center University of Maryland Medical System 
MedStar Union Memorial Hospital MedStar Health 
University of Maryland Medical Center University of Maryland Medical System 
Upper Chesapeake Medical Center University of Maryland Medical System 
 
Salisbury 
Hospital Health System 
  Atlantic General Hospital 
  McCready Foundation 
  Peninsula Regional Medical Center 
 
Takoma Park 
Hospital Health System 
Doctors Community Hospital   
Holy Cross Hospital Trinity Health 
Laurel Regional Hospital Dimensions Healthcare System 
MedStar Montgomery Medical Center MedStar Health 
Prince George's Hospital Center Dimensions Healthcare System 
Washington Adventist Hospital Adventist HealthCare 





ICD-9 CM Codes for Sepsis. 
 
 
ICD-9 CM Diagnosis Code Condition 
003.1 Salmonella Septicemia 
020.2 Septicemia Plague 
022.3 Anthrax Septicemia 
036.2 Meningococcemia 
036.3 Waterhouse-Friderichsen Syndrome 
038.0 Streptococcal Septicemia 
038.10 Staphylococcus Septicemia, Not Otherwise Specified 
038.11 Staph Auerus Septicemia 
038.12 MRSA Septicemia 
038.19 Staphylococcal Septicemia, Not Elsewhere Classified 
038.2 Pneumococcal Septicemia 
038.3 Anaerobic Septicemia 
038.40 Gram-Negative Septicemia, Not Otherwise Specified  
038.41 H. Influenae Septicemia 
038.42 E. Coli Septicemia 
038.43 Pseudomonas Septicemia 
038.44 Serratia Septicemia 
038.49 Gram-Negative Septicemia, Not Elsewhere Classified 
038.8 Septicemia, Not Elsewhere Classified 
038.9 Septicemia, Not Otherwise Specified 
054.5 Herpetic Septicemia 
098.89 Gonococcemia 
112.5 Systemic Candidiasis 
449 Septic Arterial Embolism 
785.52 Septic Shock 
790.7 Bacteremia 






ICD-9 CM Codes for Trauma, Stroke, Cardiac Arrest, and STEMI 
 
 
ICD-9 CM Diagnosis Code Condition 
800 – 904, 910 – 929, 940 - 957 Trauma 
362.3, 433.x1, 434.x1, 436 Acute Ischemic Stroke 
427.5 Cardiac Arrest 
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